UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

RICHMOND DIVISION

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

JOHN COREY FRASER, ET AL., * CIVIL ACTION 3:22-CV-00410

* FEBRUARY 8, 2023 10:12 A.M.

Plaintiffs, * MOTION HEARING

* VOLUME I OF I

VS.

*

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, * FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, *

ET AL., * Before:

* HONORABLE ROBERT E. PAYNE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: ELLIOTT M. HARDING, ESQUIRE

Harding Counsel, PLLC 608 Elizabeth Avenue

Charlottesville, VA 22901

For the Defendants: JONATHAN H. HAMBRICK, ESQUIRE

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1	APPEARANCES (continued):		
2	For the Defendants:	MICHAEL P. CLENDENEN, ESQUIRE Department of Justice-Civil	
3		Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch	
4 5		1100 L Street NW Suite 12028 Washington DC 20005	
5		Washington, DC 20005	
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         (Court convened at 10:12 a.m.)
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             THE CLERK: Case Number 3:22-CV-410, John Corey
   Fraser, et al. versus Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
 3
   Explosives, et al.
 4
 5
             The plaintiffs are represented by Elliott Harding.
             The defendants are represented by Jonathan Hambrick
 6
7
   and Michael Clendenen.
            Are counsel ready to proceed?
8
 9
            MR. HARDING: Yes.
10
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes.
11
            MR. HAMBRICK: Yes.
12
             THE COURT: All right. Well, we have a question
13
           The motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) --
14
   the 12(b)(1) motion is based on standing; is that right?
15
            MR. CLENDENEN: That's correct, Your Honor, yes.
16
             THE COURT: There's also a motion for summary
17
   judgment by the plaintiff. Let's assume the matters survive
18
   12(b)(6), is it really ripe for summary judgment? Is it
   something that can be decided on the basis of what's been done
19
20
   so far?
           Is there need for discovery, or what?
            MR. HARDING: Your Honor, it's the plaintiffs'
21
22
   position that --
23
             THE COURT: Come to the lectern, please.
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            MR. HARDING:
                           I apologize.
25
             THE COURT:
                        The court reporter can hear you better
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1
   and so can I.
2
            MR. HARDING: Insofar as the parties came together in
 3
   a pretrial conference with the Court, and recognize that we
   don't believe that there are material issues of fact and that
 4
 5
   this is something --
            THE COURT: Are there any issues of fact that need to
 6
7
   be dealt with, developed, or put in the record at all?
8
            MR. HARDING: Outside of the pleadings, the
9
   plaintiffs do not believe so, Your Honor.
10
            THE COURT: Do you share that view?
11
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
12
            THE COURT: All right. So the resolution of the
13
   basic issues resolves both the summary judgment motion and the
14
   motion to dismiss.
15
            All right. The motion to dismiss is filed first, so
16
   I'll hear that.
17
            MR. CLENDENEN: Good morning. May it please the
18
   Court. Michael Clendenen from the Department of Justice on
   behalf of the defendants.
19
            Plaintiffs in this action bring a facial
20
21
   constitutional challenge to a public safety law that has been
   on the books for over 50 years. The Court should dismiss
22
23
   plaintiffs' claims and enter a judgment on behalf of the
   defendants.
24
25
            First, plaintiffs have not met their burden of
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1 establishing they have standing because none of the plaintiffs 2 have said that their parents have refused to purchase a 3 handgun for them. THE COURT: What does that -- is that the dispositive 4 5 question on standing, is the failure of the complaint to allege that their parents have not -- that they've not asked 6 7 their parents to buy a gun for them? Is that where we are? Is that right? 8 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, it is plaintiffs' burden 9 10 to prove they have standing, so the failure for them to plead, 11 you know, certain facts in the complaint would be dispositive. 12 THE COURT: Well, I know that. I'm asking you is the 13 issue that your standing position turns on is the absence of 14 an allegation in the complaint that they did not, none of the 15 plaintiffs, ask their parents to buy a gun for them from a 16 federally firearms licensed dealer? Is that your position? 17 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --18 THE COURT: Yes or no? Get your tongue around one of 19 those two words, and then you can tell me later what your 20 views are. But I would like to hear what your answer is. 21 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. I would say yes. 22 Really, it turns on what the Court considers is plaintiffs' 23 alleged injury here. Our reading of the complaint is, really, 24 that the plaintiffs are complaining about not being able to 25 acquire or to possess a handgun.

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THE COURT: No, they're not talking about possession.
 1
2
   They're talking about purchasing it, as I understand the
 3
   complaint. Where does it say "possession"? Have I missed it?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, they might not have used
 4
 5
   the word "possession," but --
            THE COURT: Of course, the constitutional language is
 6
7
   keep and bear. So keep connotes possession, I suppose.
8
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
9
            THE COURT: But isn't the complaint against the
10
   statute that prohibits the purchase, not a statute that
11
   prohibits possession?
12
            MR. CLENDENEN: Well, even to the extent that the
13
   plaintiffs allege --
14
            THE COURT: Is the answer to that yes or no?
15
            MR. CLENDENEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. What was
16
   the --
17
            THE COURT: What is the yes or no answer to that?
18
            MR. CLENDENEN: To what question, Your Honor?
19
            THE COURT: Go right ahead.
20
            MR. CLENDENEN:
                            I apologize.
21
            THE COURT: I really ask you, when I ask a question,
22
   answer the question yes or no, and then -- or say it's not --
23
   it's a question that's not answerable yes or no, and then if
24
   you need to explain it, I'll be glad to hear your explanation.
25
   But then I understand the framework on which we're working.
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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: Understood, Your Honor.
 2
            THE COURT: All right.
 3
            MR. CLENDENEN: Even to the extent that the
   plaintiffs' alleged injury is an inability to purchase a
 4
 5
   firearm, they still, under federal law, have the option to
   have a parent purchase a firearm for them. And they can even
 6
7
   use their own money, or they could purchase a secondhand
8
   firearm -- a secondhand handgun from anyone who's not a
   federally licensed firearm dealing, such as a dealer at a gun
9
10
   show.
11
            THE COURT:
                        Somebody on the street?
12
            MR. CLENDENEN: Somebody on the street, Your Honor?
13
            THE COURT: Is it among their faults here, as
14
   respects injury in fact, is that they didn't allege that they
15
   didn't try to go out on the street and buy it?
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: I'm sorry, I did not hear that, Your
17
           That they didn't allege what?
   Honor.
18
            THE COURT: Is it that they don't allege -- is among
   their faults the failure to allege that they didn't go out on
19
20
   the street and buy a gun from somebody on the street, or they
21
   didn't try to do that?
22
            MR. CLENDENEN: In a way, yes, Your Honor. I would
23
   say that they didn't try to --
24
            THE COURT: So as I understand it now, it is the
25
   position of the United States of America and the ATF that your
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standing turns on your ability to allege, in part, that you 1 haven't violated the federal law? 2 3 MR. CLENDENEN: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Are you encouraging people to go around 4 5 Robin Hood's barn and say, "Well, I'm a parent, but I'm not going to tell you I'm giving this to my child. I'm going to 6 7 buy this and give it to my child"? Is that your -- they can 8 do that, and that keeps them from having injury according to 9 the government; is that right? 10 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. If a parent 11 purchased it from a federally licensed firearm dealer and 12 didn't tell the dealer that they were going to give it to 13 their child and then gave it to someone -- assuming that the 14 child is between the ages of 18 and 20, that would be allowed. 15 As far as purchasing something on the street, that 16 might violate some other provisions of federal law. 17 wouldn't violate the laws at issue here. THE COURT: Well, I know. But you're saying -- your 18 19 real argument is that the -- the government's position is that 20 they didn't allege injury in fact, because there are other 21 alternatives to getting possession of guns that this class of people has. One of those options is to have it gifted to them 22 23 by the parent who buys it. Another of those options is to buy it at a gun show from a nonlicensed dealer. Another is to buy 24 25 it on the street. And they don't allege that they asked for a

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1
   gift, they don't allege that they tried to buy it from a
2
   dealer, and they don't allege they bought it from -- tried to
 3
   buy it on the street. And the failure to make those
   allegations deprives them of standing, as I understand it.
 4
 5
   that your position?
            MR. CLENDENEN: For the first two, yes, Your Honor.
 6
7
   We wouldn't say that they need to allege that they tried to
   purchase it on the street, because I think that probably would
9
   violate some law. I'm not sure exactly --
10
            THE COURT: What would it violate? What law would it
   violate?
11
12
            I have a shotgun and a friend is interested in a
13
   12-gauge shotgun. Can I sell that to him without -- I don't
14
   have a license, and I'm not a dealer. It's just going to be a
15
   private sale. I can do that, can't I?
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
17
            THE COURT: I have a Glock 9-millimeter, and a Smith
18
   & Wesson .45, and a Colt long barrel that came to me through
19
   inheritance. Can I sell those on the street to Mr. Hambrick,
20
   or you, if you want to buy them?
21
            MR. CLENDENEN: You could as long as both parties are
22
   residents of the same state, Your Honor, yes.
23
            THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess I couldn't if you
24
   were felons either.
25
            MR. CLENDENEN: Correct, Your Honor.
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1
            THE COURT: Does that law apply in a private sale?
2
   Am I obligated to find out if you're a felon before I sell it
 3
   to you?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, it would be unlawful for
 4
 5
   the felon to acquire the firearm.
            THE COURT: Right.
 6
7
            MR. CLENDENEN: I confess I'm not really sure if a
8
   seller has to go through any sort of hoops to verify that the
9
   person they're selling to, if it's just a, you know,
10
   one-to-one transaction like that, if the purchasee is a felon.
11
            THE COURT: Well, let's get back to -- where does the
12
   theory come from that it's okay -- that a parent can buy a gun
13
   from a dealer, federal firearms dealer and give it to the
14
   child, and that's okay? And they then -- that's the way that
15
   people 18 to 20 ought to be getting guns, because of parental
16
   consent, where does that come from?
17
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, there's several places in
18
   the legislative history where that's made explicit. And then
19
   also the ATF opinion letter that we attached as Exhibit A to
20
   our motions specifies that that is allowed.
21
            THE COURT: Well, where in the legislative history?
22
            MR. CLENDENEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, did you want
23
   me to cite exactly where?
24
            THE COURT: Where are we talking about and what does
25
   it say?
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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: In the legislative history?
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            THE COURT: What legislative history are you talking
 3
   about, and what does that legislative history say?
            MR. CLENDENEN: So, for example, a statement of
 4
 5
   Senator Dodd at 114 Congressional Record 12309 says that, "A
   minor or juvenile would not be restricted from owning" --
 6
7
            THE REPORTER: I'm sorry.
            THE COURT: You need to, A, slow down and be clear.
8
9
   When you're reading, you tend to go fast; all of us do.
10
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
11
            "A minor or juvenile would not be restricted from
12
   owning or learning the proper usage of a firearm, since any
13
   firearm which his parent or quardian desired him to have could
14
   be obtained for the minor or juvenile by the parent or
15
   guardian. At the most, the provision could cause minor
16
   inconveniences to certain youngsters who are mature,
17
   law-abiding, and responsible by requiring that a parent or
18
   guardian over 21 years of age make a handgun purchase for any
   person under 21."
19
20
            THE COURT: Now, is it against the law for a federal
21
   firearms dealer to sell to a person having reason to believe
22
   the person is 21 -- I mean under 21?
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
                        That federal firearms dealer can be
24
            THE COURT:
25
   prosecuted for doing that? I'm a dealer, and I know that
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1 you're buying a gun, and I know that you're under 21, or have 2 reason to believe. If I sell it to you anyway, that's a 3 criminal offense, isn't it? MR. CLENDENEN: It would be a criminal offense, Your 4 5 Honor. And, also, the dealers have to -- or, I'm sorry, I'm thinking of something else. But if it's a sale not in person, 6 7 if it's over the mail or anything like that, then the seller has to get, basically, an affidavit saying that the purchaser 8 9 is over the age of 21, so yes. 10 THE COURT: So my 18-year-old who can vote, be 11 drafted, do a lot of other things, comes to me and says, "Dad, 12 here's \$800. Go over there and get me that handgun." I go 13 over and get the handgun, and I don't tell the person -- the 14 person looks at me and says, "Well, there's no way you're 15 under 21," which would be an easy look, and he doesn't ask. 16 So I give him my \$800, I get the gun, I walk out the door, and 17 I give it to my son or my daughter. That's okay, right? 18 MR. CLENDENEN: That is okay, Your Honor. And that's 19 the exact --20 THE COURT: In what world is that okay? Why is that -- why isn't that an offense against the fundamental 21 22 principle that one cannot do indirectly what you cannot do 23 directly? You are telling me that the position of the ATF is 24 that people are to engage in subterfuge to get these young --25 these 18-year-olds guns. That's what you're saying.

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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, it's not subterfuge in
2
   that situation. In fact, if the father wanted to just tell
 3
   the purchaser, "Hey, I'm buying this, and I'm going to give it
   to my 19-year-old son," that would still be fine.
 4
 5
            The whole point of this statute --
            THE COURT: He doesn't.
 6
7
            MR. CLENDENEN: It doesn't matter if the father tells
8
   the firearm dealer that it's for the 20-year-old or
9
   19-year-old.
10
            THE COURT: Where did Senator Dodd get this idea?
                                                                Is
11
   there anything in the record that tells us what put that in
   his mind?
12
13
            MR. CLENDENEN: The legislative history is very clear
14
   that the whole point of the statute is to prevent the
   clandestine purchase of firearms by minors under the age of
15
16
   21.
17
            THE COURT: What's more clandestine than the
18
   situation I just related to you? That's a clandestine
   purchase if ever one there was.
19
20
            MR. CLENDENEN: Well, essentially --
21
            THE COURT: I have gone to that firearms dealer with
22
   my son's money in hand, my daughter's money in hand, I am
23
   buying it, I don't tell him what I'm doing with it, and I walk
24
   out the door and put it in the hands of my 18-year-old who's
25
   sitting in my car.
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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --
 2
            THE COURT: Is there anything more clandestine than
 3
   that that occurs?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, the real concern is
 4
 5
   someone buying it without their parents' permission,
   basically.
 6
7
            THE COURT: What's their parents' permission got to
8
   do with it at all, and where does that notion come from?
9
   18-year-olds -- when was this statute passed?
10
            MR. CLENDENEN: In 1968, Your Honor.
11
            THE COURT: And in 1968, what was the law respecting
12
   the voting age for 18-year-olds?
            MR. CLENDENEN: I believe in 1968 it was still 21 in
13
14
   most states, if not every state.
15
            THE COURT: What about serving in the armed forces?
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: I believe -- well, either 18 or 17.
17
   I think the rules might be 17-year-olds can join with
18
   permission of their parents.
19
            THE COURT: At 18, you can join on your own, right?
20
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
21
            THE COURT: Yeah? Right? Okay. You need to say
22
   something because she's taking it down.
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: Sorry. Yes, Your Honor.
24
            THE COURT: So that's a -- so where did -- does the
25
   legislative history show where Senator Dodd came up with this
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1 statement that you rely on? 2 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, as far as that specific 3 portion, I think it -- it goes to, basically, the purpose of the statute, which is to reduce this, at the time, spike in 4 5 crime amongst young people under the age of 21. THE COURT: How does that do that if this -- if the 6 7 person can go to a licensed firearm dealer in a gun show and 8 get the gun? My daughter is 18 and she wants a Glock. She 9 goes to the firearms show. She doesn't have to have my 10 permission to go. She doesn't have to have my permission to 11 buy. She has her own money and she buys it. How is that 12 purpose of the statute aided by allowing that kind of 13 transaction? 14 MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, there was a great 15 deal of studies put into the legislative record that showed 16 that there was a large amount of crime being committed by 17 people between the age of 18 and 20 who had obtained a firearm 18 from federally licensed firearm dealers without their parents' 19 permission. And the statute was designed to eliminate that 20 possibility by at least requiring the parent to understand 21 what was going on and make the determination if their child 22 was mature enough to have a firearm. 23 THE COURT: So where are those studies referred to, 24 that the crime was being committed by people who bought guns from federally licensed firearm dealers? I didn't see a lot 25

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of reference to the fact that you just cited, that is, that
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2
   the violent crime and use of guns had been traced to people
 3
   who had bought from federally firearms dealers. But you help
   me out; I would like to read that again, read that section.
 4
 5
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm not sure exactly
   where --
 6
7
            THE DEFENDANT: What study is it or what studies?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm not sure exactly
8
9
   where it ties it to federally licensed firearm dealers.
10
            THE COURT: But you did. You said that was the
11
   purpose of the statute. There's a lot of discussion about
12
   young people committing crime and young people being arrested,
13
   but there's precious little about where the guns came from,
14
   that I found. And you just said, well, this is -- it was the
   fact that these crimes were being committed by people who had
15
16
   bought from federally licensed firearm dealers. And if you
17
   don't know that, then I want you to find it and give me the
18
   precise citation of the study, or studies, that say that, if
19
   you would do that.
20
            Mr. Hambrick, if you have something to help him, give
   it to him. It's all right.
21
22
            MR. HAMBRICK: Thank you, Your Honor.
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: So part of the Public Law Number --
24
            THE COURT: Where are you? Is it something you cited
25
   to me?
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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: It is one we cited, yes, Your Honor.
 2
            THE COURT: What document is it in?
 3
            MR. CLENDENEN: From our memo in support of the
   motion to dismiss.
 4
 5
            THE COURT: ECF-22. What page?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Bottom of page 3, top of page 4.
 6
 7
            THE COURT:
                        3 and 4.
            MR. CLENDENEN: We quoted from the Public Law Number
8
   90 - 351.
9
10
            THE COURT: That's a conclusion. But I asked you,
11
   you said there were studies showing that, and that's what I
12
   want to know, is where those studies are. They don't cite any
13
   studies there.
14
            MR. CLENDENEN: So the citation right before that,
15
   the subcommittee hearing statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, it
16
   says, "Almost all of these firearms are put into the hands of
17
   juveniles by importers, manufacturers, and dealers who operate
   under licenses issued by the federal government."
18
            THE COURT: And what are "these firearms"?
19
20
            MR. CLENDENEN: Handguns, Your Honor.
21
            THE COURT: It says that, huh? It doesn't say that.
22
   I mean, okay. All right. I think I understand your point.
23
   Go ahead.
24
            MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, on the merits
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   plaintiffs' claim also fails for a number of reasons. Under
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Heller, any condition or qualification on the commercial sale
 1
2
   of firearms is considered presumptively valid. Also, as a
 3
   historical matter, at the time the Second Amendment was
   ratified, the law of every state treated individuals under the
 4
 5
   age of 21 as a minor, and that was true up through the 1970s.
   And the majority of states throughout this Nation's history
 6
7
   have enacted restrictions on the purchase or possession of
   firearms by minors.
8
            THE COURT: What's that? Throughout what history?
9
10
            MR. CLENDENEN: So we included, I believe, Exhibit B,
11
   a chart of all the state laws, basically throughout the
12
   history of the United States that --
13
            THE COURT: You're asking me to consider laws enacted
14
   in the early 1900s and the late 1800s and the middle 1900s,
   all of those, right?
15
16
            MR. CLENDENEN:
                            That is correct, Your Honor.
17
            THE COURT: How can that be done under Bruen?
18
            MR. CLENDENEN: So under both Bruen and Heller, the
19
   Supreme Court did look not only to the laws as they were in
20
   1790 but also to 19th century law. In Heller, I believe the
21
   Court said that --
22
            THE COURT: Even if you looked to the 19th century
23
   law, you couldn't consider anything that happened in the
   1900s.
24
25
            MR. CLENDENEN: It does become attenuated as the
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1 relevance goes on, yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Aren't they so far removed they're 3 utterly attenuated and of no value? MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I wouldn't say of no 4 5 value, but it is certainly less value as time goes on. THE COURT: How about the Supreme Court? What do you 6 7 think that opinion said about how valuable current things in the 1900s were? 8 MR. CLENDENEN: In Heller, Your Honor, the court said 9 10 that 19th century cases --11 THE COURT: 19th century is the 1800s. 12 MR. CLENDENEN: Oh, I'm sorry. 1900s case law. 13 is definitely less relevant, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Well, even -- but Bruen is the 15 case that gives us the exact formula we're to follow, and it's 16 very clear what we are to do; whether you agree with it or I 17 agree with it is immaterial. We are to look at the time at 18 the founding, and, basically, they're telling you you can go a 19 few years before and a few years after and that's where you 20 And if you are considering a state law analysis so that 21 you have to look at when the Fourteenth Amendment made the 22 first ten amendments applicable to the states, then you can go 23 into the history that is pertinent up to and a little after 24 the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 So we're not dealing with a state law. We're dealing

1 with a federal law. And as I understand it, our -- the time 2 period that we are to look at as driving the decision is a 3 time before the Second Amendment was enacted and a reasonable time after that. Do you agree that that's what Bruen tells us 4 to look at first and foremost? 5 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor, in that the relevant 6 7 time period -- the relevant question is, what was the historical understanding when the Second Amendment was 8 9 ratified? However --10 THE COURT: Which was when? 11 MR. CLENDENEN: 1791, Your Honor. However, as the 12 Supreme Court said in Heller, subsequent state laws and case 13 law into the 19th century, at least, is a critical tool of 14 understanding what the understanding was in 1791, because the 15 original understanding of what the Second Amendment meant 16 isn't quickly forgotten, basically. 17 So if states were passing this sort of regulation in 18 the 19th century, it's presumed that they weren't doing so 19 in violation of the Second Amendment, certainly not when you 20 have as many states passing this kind of restriction as we 21 have here, as opposed to just one one-off regulation here and 22 there. 23 But to the point that I think Your Honor is getting 24 at is that there were no laws exactly on point in 1791, where 25 a state, you know, set 21 as the minimum age for purchase or

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possession of a firearm.
 1
 2
            THE COURT: Or before or after.
 3
            MR. CLENDENEN: So two points --
            THE COURT: Over what period of time?
 4
 5
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: There were none before 1791.
 6
 7
            MR. CLENDENEN: None that said --
8
            THE COURT: When did they come in after 1791? What's
   the first --
9
10
            MR. CLENDENEN:
                            I believe the mid-1800s.
11
            THE COURT: So that would be 50 to 60 years after the
12
   amendment was adopted, right?
            MR. CLENDENEN: Correct, Your Honor. But I should
13
14
   also note that it's true there were no laws that set 21 as the
15
   minimum age in 1971. But there were also no laws up to, at
16
   least, 1850 or so that set 18 as the minimum age or that set
17
   any minimum age.
18
            THE COURT: Set what now?
19
            MR. CLENDENEN: There were no state laws that set a
20
   minimum age for purchase or possession of a firearm at any
21
   number up until the 1850s or so. So if we take this -- this
22
   understanding to its logical extreme, then it would mean that
23
   anyone, regardless of age, has a Second Amendment right to
24
   purchase or possess handguns, even a six-year-old, because
   there were no laws in 1791 that set 18 as the minimum age or
25
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1 set 16 as a minimum age. So it must be that there's some sort 2 of minimum age because, otherwise, it would be an absurd 3 result. So because the age of majority in 1791 was 21 for 4 5 general purposes, it should be assumed that states and the federal government can set any number, at least up to 21, as 6 7 the minimum age. That's consistent with what the historical understanding of the Constitution would have been at that 8 9 time. 10 THE COURT: All right. What were the -- as I 11 understand it, in 1791, the places -- the states had the 12 requirement if you were 18, you had to be in the militia. 13 MR. CLENDENEN: A couple things, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: And also that you had to provide your own 15 armaments if you were going to be in the militia. So what's 16 the import of that -- your paper doesn't even dispute that now 17 that you've submitted that state law is applicable. 18 MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, actually, in 1789, 19 when the Constitution was ratified, and in 1791, when the 20 Second Amendment was ratified, a majority of states, I believe 21 11 out of 14, actually set 16 as the age for militia service, 22 not 18. 23 THE COURT: But the 16 was set during the war. 24 was set -- a year age limit was set because they didn't have 25 enough people to fight the British. That's what happened.

1 And even the import of Hessians wasn't sufficient, so they 2 went down and they dropped the age. Before then, it had been 18. 3 MR. CLENDENEN: The age before --4 5 THE COURT: Right? 6 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, the age limit before 7 between 1791 varied a bit. So some states had 16 as the minimum age all along; some states had 18 and then went down 9 to 16, or back and forth. It was later, mostly in the 1790s, 10 that states moved to 18 as the minimum age for militia 11 service. 12 THE COURT: What year? MR. CLENDENEN: Later in the 1790s, after the Second 13 14 Amendment was ratified. But when the Second Amendment was 15 ratified, 16 was --16 THE COURT: What did they need back then? What was 17 going on back then? What did they need? 18 MR. CLENDENEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I don't --19 THE COURT: They needed to raise the standing militia because the previous militias had been kind of eradicated in 20 21 the war, or decimated. They needed to get some new blood in, 22 didn't they? So that's why they were focusing on it. And 23 they all said, "Hey, 18 is the age in which you have to serve in the militia, and, by the way, you have to buy your own arms 24 25 or have them provided to you. We're not arming you. We don't

have the money to do that." 1 2 MR. CLENDENEN: So a number of states, Your Honor, 3 specifically had statutes that said that the person's parents, if they were under the age of 21, had to furnish --4 5 THE COURT: Provide. 6 MR. CLENDENEN: -- a firearm, which we think is 7 totally consistent with the challenged law at issue here, 8 which is that there is parental supervision for anyone under 9 the age of 21, even if they're serving in the militia. 10 But the bigger point that I want to make here is that 11 this question of militia service is really not relevant to the 12 challenge here. Under Heller, the Supreme Court said that 13 there's an individual right to keep and bear arms primarily 14 for self-defense, and that that's wholly separate and apart 15 from the collective right to bear arms as part of a militia. 16 The plaintiffs here don't claim that they're part of 17 a militia or that they want to be. So, presumably, they're 18 seeking this declaration of a Second Amendment right pursuant to their individual right to --19 20 THE COURT: No, but you look -- they're suggesting, 21 as I understand it, that you look at the requirement for the 22 age of entry into the militia and the requirement to bear arms 23 as informing the purchase, the purchase, not that they're 24 saying that the right arises from. 25 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, that is plaintiffs'

argument. That is plaintiffs' argument. And the point we're 1 2 making is that it's really confusing two different things. The status of militia laws has to do with service in the 3 militia and the collective right as part of a militia, and if 4 5 what they're asking for is part of their individual right, then the more appropriate historical inquiry is just to see 6 7 what the state laws have done with regards to an individual purchase of a firearm, not as part of a militia service. 8 9 THE COURT: There were none. State laws did not 10 prohibit anything in the way of purchasing in the, say, 10 11 years before 1791 or the 10 years after, right? 12 MR. CLENDENEN: It is true, Your Honor, that in 1791, 13 and thereabouts, there were no state laws specifically that 14 set a minimum age for purchasing a firearm. 15 THE COURT: The first ones came, you said a minute 16 ago, 50 to 60 years after the amendment was ratified, right? 17 MR. CLENDENEN: That is correct, Your Honor. But, 18 again, that would -- the plaintiffs' argument is, basically, 19 that that fact alone, you know, sets what the standard for the Second Amendment is. That would mean that it's not possible 20 21 for any state to ever set a minimum age, even 18 or a lower 22 number, for purchasing a firearm. So, you know, a 23 six-year-old would have an unrestricted Second Amendment right 24 to go into a firearms store and purchase a handgun under that 25 theory, basically. There's no principled way to set the line

1 at 18 as opposed to 21 or some lower number. 2 As I understand plaintiffs' argument, they're 3 basically saying that the age of majority now is 18 in most states, and that that, therefore, shifts where the Second 4 5 Amendment right needs to go, which is exactly the opposite of what Heller and Bruen say to do. As far as this originalist 6 7 analysis goes, the Court is supposed to look at what the laws 8 of 1791 were, so it's irrelevant that states after the 1970s 9 have lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18. 10 THE COURT: Why do we look at the age of majority? 11 Why do we even look at that? MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, the age of majority 12 13 basically sets where most rights begin. In 1791, age of 14 majority is 21, so you had to be 21 to vote. In most places, 15 I believe, you know, entering a contract you had to be 21. 16 All these various civic rights were established at 21. 17 So, essentially, where the Constitution sets a right 18 and doesn't say that it vests at a certain age, it should be 19 assumed that the age of majority is where that right vests, at 20 least as far as this originalist analysis goes, which is what 21 the Supreme Court has said to do with regards to the Second 22 Amendment. 23 THE COURT: All right. And your case for that proposition is what? I didn't find anything that actually 24 25 said that. Do you have something, or that I missed?

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1
            MR. CLENDENEN: As far as a case that encapsulates
2
   all of that, Your Honor --
 3
            THE COURT: What's that?
            MR. CLENDENEN: As far as a case that encapsulates
 4
 5
   all of that, Your Honor --
            THE COURT: Just say there isn't any or give me the
 6
7
   name of it, one or the other.
            MR. CLENDENEN: The closest thing I would say, Your
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9
   Honor, is the Fifth Circuit's decision in the NRA case --
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            THE REPORTER:
                           I'm sorry, the what?
11
            MR. CLENDENEN: NRA, National Rifle Association case.
12
            THE COURT: The preBruen case.
13
            MR. CLENDENEN: It is a preBruen case, Your Honor,
14
   but it does the same historical analysis that Bruen says to
15
   do.
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            THE COURT: Did it, really? It didn't quite -- to my
17
   knowledge, the Bruen formulation, at least insofar as an
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   instruction about how to proceed, is the first of its kind.
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   It first appeared in Bruen, not that the different points had
20
   not appeared in various and sundry discussions about how to
21
   proceed. Is that correct, that Bruen gives us an entirely new
22
   framework?
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, an entirely new
24
   framework, under Heller, the Supreme Court did say to do a
25
   historical analysis. In the time period between Heller and
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1 Bruen, what most circuits did was they set up this two-step 2 analysis where step one was a historical analysis, and then 3 step two was if, basically, the regulation was something that would have been covered by the Second Amendment at the 4 5 founding, then they did some sort of means-end scrutiny, other intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny to see who would, 6 7 nonetheless, pass. What the Fifth Circuit did -- sorry, Bruen says just 8 9 opposite of step one. If it falls within the scope of things 10 that were protected under the Second Amendment at the 11 founding, then it's invalid; and if it falls outside of that, 12 then the government can regulate it. What the Fifth Circuit did in NRA was they did the 13 14 step one analysis, they went through the whole historical 15 understanding, everything that I've said here as far as age of 16 majority goes --17 THE COURT: Right. But they didn't look at the 18 militia laws much, did they? MR. CLENDENEN: They didn't note about the militia 19 20 laws, Your Honor, but they --They didn't know about them? 21 THE COURT: 22 MR. CLENDENEN: They did, Your Honor; they said a few 23 First, they said that, you know, basically, all the points I'm making, which is that it's not really relevant with 24 regards to this nonmilitia right; also, the fact that the 25

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militia laws at 1791 set 16 as the minimum age in most states
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   proved too much; that it would basically mean that 16 should
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   be the cutoff and not 18, even though the plaintiffs in that
   case and in this case have said they're only challenging laws
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 5
   that, you know, set a number higher than 18 as the minimum.
            But the NRA decision in the Fifth Circuit, it did go
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7
   through all the historical analysis. It did, then, go on to
8
   step two and say, you know, even if it weren't -- even it were
9
   historically not allowed, it would still -- you know, the
10
   government would still win under the step --
11
            THE COURT: You're saying you're relying on the
12
   historical analysis as performed in the NRA case by the Fifth
   Circuit?
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14
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
15
            THE COURT: All right.
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: And just to note also --
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            THE COURT: What about the people argument that
18
   you-all make? What's that all about? Do you want to help me
   with that a little bit? Who are "the people"?
19
20
            MR. CLENDENEN:
                           So, Your Honor, we didn't include any
   argument about the texts, specifically the phrasing of "the
21
22
   people," ourselves.
23
            THE COURT: You're not pushing that point?
24
            MR. CLENDENEN: We're not pushing it, Your Honor.
                                                                Ι
25
   believe one of the amicus --
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1 THE COURT: You believe the plaintiffs are within 2 "the people"? 3 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --THE COURT: Well, you didn't make the argument. 4 5 of the other cases that you cite did. But you're not pushing it. You're not even making the argument. So I'm assuming 6 7 that you are taking the view that "the people" in the Second -- as used in the Second Amendment includes the 8 9 plaintiffs, would include the plaintiffs, yes or no? 10 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, we haven't taken a 11 position on it. If we were forced to take a position, we 12 would probably make the argument that the use of the words 13 "the people" in the Second Amendment specifically refers to 14 the political community at the time, which was people who were 15 of voting age, so 21-year-olds and older. So at least --16 THE COURT: You would take the position that "the 17 people" does not include women, because that wasn't in the 18 political community at the time; is that right? 19 MR. CLENDENEN: Again, Your Honor, we haven't made 20 that argument, but if we had to, then, yes, we would say that. 21 THE COURT: So you're taking the position that --22 because you have to. You have to deal with it. I have to 23 deal with it, so you have to take a position. You can't change your -- if you're not going -- you know, you're sort of 24 25 are saying, "We're not making the argument," so I didn't

1 consider it to be an issue. But the cases you cite consider 2 it to be an issue. Now you say, "Well, if we have to take a 3 position, then what we will do is say that 'the people' means the political community." And that then, in turn, means that 4 5 you are taking the position that no women are included in "the people"; is that right? Do you really want to say that? If 6 7 you do, say it. MR. CLENDENEN: No, Your Honor, at least --8 9 THE COURT: No black citizens are included in "the 10 people," right, under that interpretation, the political 11 community at the time? 12 MR. CLENDENEN: At the very least, Your Honor, the 13 Fourteenth Amendment would have changed that. 14 THE COURT: No, it wouldn't. The Fourteenth 15 Amendment doesn't tell us what "the people" was -- were at the 16 time of the founding. 17 Now, are you saying that the analysis of "the people" 18 is made at a time different than the founding? Because 19 earlier you told me that the political community at the 20 founding was the measure of "the people." And if that's the 21 case, then the Fourteenth Amendment would not have changed 22 anything, because the founding -- the Fourteenth Amendment 23 didn't come until well after the founding. And at the time, the political -- of the founding, the political community 24 included no women, it included no blacks. Who else did it not 25

include? 1 2 MR. CLENDENEN: I'm not sure, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: At a bare minimum, that's a fair segment of the population of the United States who are not protected 4 5 by the Second Amendment issue here, and they are people who I believe have been accorded significant rights under our laws 6 7 since that time. Really, don't I judge "the people" by what, say, in Heller, they did? They kind of just said, "Okay, 8 9 you're part of 'the people.'" 10 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I don't think Heller 11 specifically says anything about whether women or persons of 12 different races --13 THE COURT: No, it doesn't say one way or the other. 14 It just says, "We're looking at you today as part of 'the 15 people.'" It wasn't an issue in Heller, that they -- a bar in 16 Heller. 17 So I just need to know, does the government want me 18 to look at what "the people" meant at the founding or at some other time? If some other time, what is it? You're telling 19 20 me the founding, and that has consequences, obviously. Every 21 position or argument we make has some kind of consequence. 22 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm not sure. I would 23 say that the Fifth Amendment due process clause, as the 24 plaintiffs have made this argument, does include an equal 25 protection component the Supreme Court has found, and at the

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   very least, that would apply to women and racial minorities.
 2
   So if a state were to -- or if the federal government were to
 3
   try to differentiate, you know, a firearms law today on the
   grounds of men versus women --
 4
            THE COURT: Basically, I can consider the plaintiffs
 5
   as among "the people," then.
 6
7
            MR. CLENDENEN: No, Your Honor, because their issue
8
   is that they're under the age of 21. What we're saying is
9
   that that doesn't fall within "the people" under the Second
10
   Amendment.
11
            THE COURT: I thought you weren't saying that.
                                                            I
12
   thought you were saying they were people, but they were people
13
   who couldn't bear arms, purchase arms. There's a big
14
   difference between whether they're people and whether those
15
   people, whoever they may be, can purchase arms.
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: Well, Your Honor, what we're saying
17
   is that it's consistent with the historical understanding in
18
   1791 that persons under the age of 21 would not have this
19
   right to bear arms that the Second Amendment has -- that
   Heller said.
20
21
            THE COURT: Okay. But in your brief, you are not
22
   making the argument that the plaintiffs are not people.
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: We did not make that argument in the
24
   briefs, no, Your Honor.
25
            THE COURT: I don't think you can make it now.
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1 All right. Go ahead. I interrupted you. 2 MR. CLENDENEN: Regarding plaintiffs' equal 3 protection claim, the Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect class and, therefore, the law is valid so long as --4 5 under the equal protection doctrine is valid so long as it passes rational basis review, which it easily does here. 6 7 the legislative history spells out, in 1968 there was significant findings that persons under the age of 21 --8 9 THE COURT: When was the decision that age is not a 10 suspect classification? 11 MR. CLENDENEN: When was it, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. CLENDENEN: It was the Kimel decision, which I 13 14 think was around 2000. I can get the exact year. It's a 2000 15 case, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: When was the ADA [sic] passed? 17 MR. CLENDENEN: I believe the ADA was passed in the 18 early '90s, Your Honor. The plaintiffs aren't making an ADA 19 claim here. 20 THE COURT: Well, I know. Generally, your view is 21 that the federal government or anybody can discriminate 22 against people on the basis of age and it's okay, as long as 23 you can find some reasonable rational basis for doing it? 24 MR. CLENDENEN: As far as an equal protection 25 analysis goes, Your Honor, it is okay so long as there's a

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   rational basis. There might be other laws --
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            THE COURT: I can go to a restaurant and they can
 3
   say, "Old man, you can't come in, and the reason you can't
   come in is because we are not comfortable having old people
 4
 5
   who are prone to falling in our restaurant. We don't have
   liability insurance for that"? That's a very rational basis,
 6
7
   isn't it?
            MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor --
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9
            THE COURT: Can they do that to me?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: That would be a private establishment
11
   and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or
12
   of the Fifth Amendment wouldn't apply.
13
            THE COURT: Okay. Now let's take it to the cafeteria
14
   in the courthouse. Cafeteria in the courthouse -- so the
   private restaurant can do that, right? Now let's take it to
15
16
   the cafeteria downstairs, when it used to serve food instead
17
   of being a Horn & Hardart. Can they say, "Look, old boy, you
18
   can't come in because I notice you have a cane and, really, we
   don't want you in here"?
19
20
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, it likely would violate
   some other law, perhaps the ADA --
21
22
            THE COURT: No, the ADA is what? It's the age
   discrimination in what act?
23
24
            MR. CLENDENEN: Oh, the ADEA? I'm sorry, Your Honor,
25
   I thought you said the ADA. Your Honor, I confess that I'm
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1
   not really an expert in this area of federal law --
2
            THE COURT: It wouldn't be a Fifth Amendment
 3
   violation. It would exist not because -- if there was a right
   under the ADA or the ADEA, it would exist by virtue of
 4
 5
   statute. It wouldn't -- I wouldn't have a Fifth Amendment
   claim as Count Two to my complaint alleging Count One as a
 6
   violation of one or both of those statutes.
7
            MR. CLENDENEN: That's correct, Your Honor, as long
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9
   as rational basis would be satisfied, which is a very low bar,
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   as the Court has surmised.
11
            THE COURT: Who has the burden of proving what here?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: For an Equal Protection Clause
13
   violation, Your Honor?
14
            THE COURT: No. No. Let's leave equal protection
15
   behind.
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: Okay. On the Second Amendment
17
   claims, Your Honor, because Bruen is so new, it's a little
18
   unclear.
            THE COURT: What's that?
19
20
            MR. CLENDENEN: So Bruen is so new, Your Honor, it's
   a little unclear. But in Heller, the Supreme Court did say
21
22
   that a condition or qualification on the commercial sale of
23
   firearms is presumptively valid. And Bruen didn't
24
   specifically say that it was overruling that part of Heller,
25
   so under that -- at least under that presumption, we would say
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that the plaintiffs have the burden of showing that this is, 1 2 you know, something the Second Amendment would cover. 3 As a general matter, for things that aren't presumptively valid under that section of Heller, it would 4 5 ordinarily be the government's burden to show some historical analogue to the restrictions at issue. 6 7 THE COURT: And the historical analogue that you have 8 to show is what? 9 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, in Bruen and Heller, the 10 Court said that it doesn't have to be an exact match, just 11 analogous. THE COURT: Bruen holds that if the Second 12 13 Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, then 14 you do the next look. And if it does, then the Constitution 15 presumptively protects that conduct. If the conduct is 16 presumptively protected, then the government must justify its 17 regulations demonstrating that it's consistent with the 18 Nation's historical tradition of firearms regulation. Isn't that where we are? 19 20 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: So they have to show that it is -- that 22 the plain text, according to Bruen, covers an individual's 23 conduct, right? MR. CLENDENEN: 24 Yes, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Well, they don't make the argument that

1 the plain text covers it, right? 2 MR. CLENDENEN: Not in the briefing that I saw, no, 3 Your Honor. I mean --THE COURT: And then so what rule applies when the 4 5 plain text doesn't cover the conduct as to the burden, who's got what burden? We're in a situation where I think both of 6 7 you agree the plain text doesn't cover the conduct. MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: So what happens then? Who's got what 10 burden? MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm not sure. I don't 11 12 think I have that portion of Bruen right in front of me, but 13 it might just be that if the plain text doesn't cover it, then 14 that's the end of the matter and the government's regulation 15 is permissible. 16 THE COURT: So is your view that you never get into 17 this historical analysis until -- unless the Second 18 Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct and 19 thereby protects that conduct presumptively? And if it is 20 presumptively protected, then the government has to justify 21 the regulation by demonstrating its consistency with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. I didn't 22 23 see all that argument made in your paper. I'm a little 24 confused about who you think has what burden. Can you help 25 me?

1 MR. CLENDENEN: I'm honestly not sure, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Well, maybe you can think about it. Is 3 there any other point you would like to make? MR. CLENDENEN: The other point that I was going to 4 5 make, not on that, Your Honor, is that once -- if the Court does do the historical analysis -- sorry. 6 7 THE COURT: Bruen also says the burden is on the 8 government to "affirmatively prove that its firearms 9 regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits 10 the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms." Do you 11 agree that that's correct? 12 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. The Court also 13 said, "Even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer 14 for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to 15 pass constitutional muster." 16 THE COURT: So the burden here, then, is on the 17 government to affirmatively prove that the firearms 18 regulations at issue here and the statute is part of the 19 historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the 20 right to keep and bear arms; is that right? 21 MR. CLENDENEN: Only if the Court --22 THE COURT: You said yes. 23 MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, I will double-check. 24 If the plain text does not cover the plaintiffs' conduct, then 25 I believe that that's the end of the matter and there's no

1 need to do the historical analysis. If the Court does find 2 that the plain text covers it and then proceeds to do the 3 historical analysis, then, in most instances, the burden is on the government to show some analogous historical precursor; 4 5 although, it doesn't have to be a dead ringer. But in this instance, because the challenged law is a condition or 6 7 qualification on the commercial sale of a firearm, it's still presumptively valid under Heller. 8 9 THE COURT: Bruen, at 366 U.S. 50, says, "We 10 reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment 11 is as follows: When the Second Amendment's plain text covers 12 an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively 13 protects that conduct. The government must then justify its 14 regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only 15 16 then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls 17 outside the Second Amendment . . ." 18 So what is your position is to whether the Second 19 Amendment's plain text covers the conduct at issue here? 20 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, since the plaintiffs 21 didn't make an argument that the plain text covers the 22 conduct, and we would agree with that, then I think the result 23 under Bruen is to just stop and that the --THE COURT: Where in your brief is there an argument 24 25 that they didn't make the argument that the Constitution's

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   plain text covers the individual's conduct here and,
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   therefore, the analysis called for by Bruen doesn't apply?
 3
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, we didn't make that
   argument in our brief.
 4
            THE COURT: No, you didn't. So what am I to do with
 5
 6
   that? Now you're saying, "Well, if the plain text doesn't
7
   cover it, then Bruen's historical analysis framework doesn't
   even apply," right?
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9
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor.
10
            THE COURT: Isn't that what you just told me?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes. If the Court would like a
12
   supplemental brief on that issue, we would be happy to oblige.
13
            THE COURT: Is there anything else you want to go
14
   over?
15
            MR. CLENDENEN: If the Court has any other questions,
16
   I'm happy to answer.
17
            THE COURT: Not right now, but I may.
18
            MR. CLENDENEN:
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
19
            THE COURT: Let me hear from the plaintiff.
20
            Do you need a break?
21
            THE REPORTER: I'm good.
22
            MR. HARDING: Good morning, Your Honor.
23
            THE COURT: Okay. Good morning.
24
            Now, Bruen says, "When the Second Amendment's plain
25
   text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution
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1
   presumptively protects that conduct."
2
            I don't see anything in your paper telling me what
 3
   part of the plain text of the Second Amendment covers what
   conduct. Where is that? In the complaint or in the papers or
 4
 5
   anything else? Y'all launch off making these big, long
   historical arguments, but the Supreme Court circumscribed that
 6
   issue. And I don't see -- did you raise it in your papers and
7
   I missed it?
8
            MR. HARDING: Respectfully, Your Honor, on page 5 of
9
10
   our --
11
            THE COURT: Yeah, help me with it.
12
            MR. HARDING: On page 5 of our response to
13
   the government's --
14
            THE COURT: Just a minute. Just a minute. Let me
15
   get there. That's --
16
            MR. HARDING: Document 27.
17
            THE COURT: Yes, I just have to get there. There's a
18
   lot of paper here.
19
            Page 5.
20
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor.
21
            THE COURT: And where?
22
            MR. HARDING: It's the second full sentence starting
23
   "because." I'll quote. "Because the plain text of the Second
   Amendment covers ordinary, law-abiding 18- to 20-year-olds
24
25
   purchasing a handgun for self-defense, that conduct is
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presumptively protected by the Constitution." And then we
 1
 2
   actually reference a 2022 case that rested on that finding.
 3
            THE COURT: Is that that case from Texas?
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. But -- yes, insofar
 4
 5
   as the citation for that point. But the point is we do
   make that --
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7
            THE COURT: Where is the text? Let's get the
8
   amendment out and let me see it. Let's see that text.
9
            MR. HARDING: Insofar as the text of the Second
10
   Amendment itself?
11
            THE COURT: For the first time in a long time I can't
12
   lay my hands -- oh, here it is.
            All right. Let's find the Constitution here.
13
14
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor.
15
            THE COURT: Where does it say that? I have Amendment
16
   2, "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security
17
   of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
18
   arms, shall not be infringed." So do you want the
19
   Constitution, to see if I read it right?
20
            MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor. That is the text of
21
   the Constitution.
22
            THE COURT: Well, what is text the covers the conduct
23
   here? Which part of the text?
24
            MR. HARDING: Keep. The word "keep," Your Honor,
25
   inherently requires one to be able to possess and procure.
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1 One cannot keep a firearm without procuring said firearm, and 2 so it's our position that the keeping of the firearm --3 THE COURT: You can't keep a firearm without procuring it? 4 5 MR. HARDING: Correct. THE COURT: Procuring it means you obtained it in one 6 7 of several ways. According to the government, it means that a 8 gift, the parents' gift is sufficient. That's procurement. 9 Where did you get your firearm? Procure is a word for "get" 10 in that sentence, right? 11 MR. HARDING: Correct, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: I got it from my parents. I procured it 13 from my parents. Okay. 14 MR. HARDING: And in that respect, we're not challenging any law that would bar a parent from gifting one 15 16 to their child. That would be a different challenge. But in 17 this respect, we do --18 THE COURT: You rely on McCraw for -- as the only 19 authority that you have that the text of the Second Amendment 20 covers the conduct at issue such as to bring into play the 21 statement I have read several times from Bruen; is that 22 correct? 23 MR. HARDING: As the only -- the court deciding the 24 only case post Bruen, that is the only case post Bruen that 25 references it pursuant to the Bruen analysis in this way, yes.

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1
            THE COURT: Now, where in that case is that to be
 2
   found?
 3
            MR. HARDING: We cite it at page 20.
            THE COURT: Just a minute. I just need to find it.
 4
 5
   McCraw is the case you cite, and I have it here in front of
   me. So where does it hold that?
 6
7
            MR. HARDING: The only citation we have is off of the
8
   Lexis citation.
                    I'm not sure which source the Court may have,
9
   but we have it here listed as page 20 of the Lexis citation.
10
   Admittedly, I don't know if it's made it to publication yet.
11
            THE COURT: My citation goes to -- there isn't any
12
   page 20 in my version of it. So what paragraph does it come
13
   under? Start reading the paragraph that it comes under, and
14
   then I'll find it by looking at my copy of the Federal Rule
15
   service. Oh, God, this is 20 WL.
16
            MR. HARDING: That would be the Westlaw.
                                                       That would
17
   be the Westlaw citation.
18
            THE COURT: Yeah, that's Westlaw.
            Where is it?
19
20
            MR. HARDING: We don't quote -- I don't have the --
            THE COURT: Where is it?
21
22
            MR. HARDING: I don't have the McCraw case.
23
            THE COURT: Here, would you give this to him and let
24
   him find it.
25
            MR. HARDING: Sure. Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Would you find it and share it with us?
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 2
   The part you're talking about would help.
 3
            MR. HARDING: Thank you.
            THE COURT: Read the page number.
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 5
            MR. HARDING: Sure. This would be on page 8 of the
   Westlaw citation.
 6
 7
            THE COURT: And the text is what?
8
            MR. HARDING: It says, quote, "Bruen is clear:
9
   the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's
10
   conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
11
   Because (as detailed above) the plain text covers ordinary,
12
   law-abiding 18- to 20-year-olds carrying a handgun for
13
   self-defense outside of the home, that conduct is
14
   presumptively protected by the Constitution."
15
            THE COURT: Now, so he says "look above," show me
16
   above where he demonstrates the proposition that the Second
17
   Amendment text covers the law-abiding, et cetera, et cetera.
18
   Where does that analysis appear in that case?
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            MR. HARDING: Starting on page 7 of the opinion, and
20
   the Court titled its subheading as, quote, "Texas cannot rebut
21
   the Court's conclusion that the plain text covers the proposed
22
   course of conduct."
23
            THE COURT: And goes to where?
24
            MR. HARDING: It goes to the end of page 8.
25
            THE COURT: Where you begin the next quote?
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1 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 3 MR. HARDING: Now, we recognize that this McCraw case does not specifically go into the procurement aspect of a 4 5 commercial purchase issue, which is what's before the Court in this case, but we do believe that the Court's finding as to 6 7 the plain text --THE COURT: What was the issue here in McCraw? 8 MR. HARDING: In McCraw, it was the 18- to 9 10 21-year-olds in Texas couldn't, I believe, get a concealed 11 carry permit. They couldn't go out with their handguns or 12 their firearms on them out in public. 13 And the government's argument in that case was very 14 much similar to the exact same argument here today. It's just 15 instead of it being about public carry, it was -- today it's 16 about procurement altogether in a commercial purchase setting 17 from an FFL. We do believe that we've adequately raised the 18 fact that we do think the plain text covers this conduct. 19 THE COURT: Where in the complaint do you raise that? 20 MR. HARDING: In the complaint -- I don't think we 21 say the words "plain text" in the complaint, but insofar as we 22 claim that it's a facial challenge -- I mean it facially 23 violates the Second Amendment, we believe that we've satisfied 24 the pleadings standard for the purposes of making that 25 argument. And then, of course, our responses and in our

motion for summary judgment, we've brought that to light as 1 2 well. 3 THE COURT: On page 5, you say, "Because the plain text of the Second Amendment covers ordinary, law-abiding 18-4 5 to 20-year-olds purchasing a handgun for self-defense, that conduct is presumptively protected by the Constitution." The 6 7 citation is Cf. McCraw, and you're citing McCraw, which is a concealed carry case, to support that proposition. Where else 8 9 in your brief do you address the issue of what the plain text 10 of the amendment provides? 11 MR. HARDING: Your Honor, it's our position that our 12 entire argument is that it violates the plain text. We don't 13 repeat the term "plain text" repeatedly, but that's the heart 14 of the entire case. If it's not a Second Amendment case at 15 all, then that's why we've brought the due process claims. 16 And we'll recognize that prior to Bruen's decision, 17 including the Fifth Circuit decision that the government 18 relies on, a lot of courts found that those under 21 are 19 outside the scope of Second Amendment altogether. And mind 20 you, the government is not arguing that it's the conduct that is outside of the Second Amendment and it's not the firearm 21 that's outside of the Second Amendment, it's the 22 23 classification of individual who falls outside of the text of 24 the Second Amendment. 25 THE COURT: What is the conduct referred to -- what

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   conduct is referred to in the Bruen statement which says, "We
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   reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment
 3
   is as follows: When the Second Amendment's plain text covers
   an individual's conduct"? What conduct is Bruen talking about
 5
   there? What's the conduct in Bruen, in other words?
            MR. HARDING: I mean, Bruen, it's the carrying of
 6
7
   the -- it's the -- I believe -- oh, no. In Bruen it's the
8
   "shall" clause versus -- or the "shall" issue versus "may"
9
   issue permitting structure. If the Court is familiar with
10
   that, I think it's around 43 or more states have what they
11
   call "shall" issue permitting requirements, where as long as
12
   one satisfies the statutory --
13
            THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but I'm trying
14
   to go more basic than that. I'm trying to find out what the
15
   court means when it says, "the conduct."
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            MR. HARDING: In that case, it's the keeping of the
17
   firearm on them in public, outside of the home.
18
   ultimately what the court --
19
            THE COURT: Without -- but I thought the keeping of
20
   the conduct -- of the permit outside the home -- of the gun
21
   outside the home without a permit which requires a showing of
22
   special need.
23
            MR. HARDING: Correct, Your Honor. But the
24
   conduct --
            THE COURT: So the basic issue is possession of the
25
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firearm. 1 2 MR. HARDING: Outside of the home. 3 THE COURT: Outside of the home. MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. That was the heart of 4 5 the matter in Bruen, as far as the conduct. We suggest that both post Bruen and prior to Bruen, 6 7 it is -- was the law and still is the law, the commercial transactions of this nature, the conduct of this case falls 8 9 within the scope of the Second Amendment. And that's 10 consistent with the Fourth Circuit's opinion. THE COURT: You define the conduct as what in this 11 12 case? 13 MR. HARDING: The purchase of an unowned handgun --14 THE COURT: Purchase of what? MR. HARDING: Of a previously unowned handgun from a 15 16 commercially licensed firearm dealer. So --17 THE COURT: What if the firearm dealer is licensed 18 and sells a previously owned one? What's the difference? MR. HARDING: Well, insofar as this is not the -- the 19 difference is, is that a FFL, a federally licensed firearm 20 21 dealer, is the only source by which someone in the plaintiffs' 22 position can purchase this type of a handgun. We recognize 23 there are alternative methods to purchasing pre-owned 24 handguns. We don't believe that that, you know, saves the law 25 from the Second Amendment scrutiny in this case, but we would

1 just note that the firearm -- the FFL is the only source by 2 which an unowned handgun can enter the market. But even if the Court doesn't distinguish between the 3 pre-owned and the new handgun, at the end of the day, it's the 4 5 purchase, the commercial purchase of the quintessential self-defense weapon, mind you. That's what Heller refers to 6 7 as the handgun. So this isn't a case about just all guns generally. 8 9 We certainly aren't making that case. This case has nothing 10 to do with long guns or higher caliber firearms that are 11 actually still available to the clients to purchase. They can 12 go into the same federally licensed firearm dealer and 13 purchase an AR-15 --14 THE COURT: Is an AK-47 and AR-15, is that something 15 they can purchase? 16 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: If they're 18? 18 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. My clients can walk in and purchase a higher caliber, a long gun, but they can't 19 go in and purchase the firearm that is considered the 20 21 quintessential self-defense weapon pursuant to Heller because 22 of its ability to defend. The handgun is inherently more of 23 an available, hidable, transportable, carryable firearm, and that is why it's considered the quintessential self-defense 24 25 weapon as found by Heller.

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And not to digress too much. I know that the Court initially asked are we pursuing this claim under the plain text argument. We believe we've adequately raised it in the complaint and in --THE COURT: Other than that on page 5 of your brief, ECF-27, where else do you discuss the plain text statement from --MR. HARDING: We cite the exact same case, the McCraw case, for the same reasons on page 3 of our motion for summary judgment. THE COURT: And that's it? MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. And, of course, Bruen itself is cited as to the standard here for review, but there aren't any post Bruen decisions applying, that we know of, that Bruen -- post Bruen decisions of the courts having to explicitly rule for or against the idea that commercial purchasing is or is not part of the plain text. We just think the term "keep" on the plain text inherently -- it includes procurement, and we -- because without the ability to procure, one doesn't have the ability to keep. THE COURT: Well, I can keep it if my father gives it to me, if I'm 18. And I can keep it if I buy it at a gun dealer, and I can keep it if you sell it to me in a private transaction. MR. HARDING: Correct, Your Honor. We would say that

those are alternative methods of procurement. But the 1 2 question is whether or not the conduct at issue is within the 3 scope of the Second Amendment's plain text. We believe all of those methods would also generally fall within the construct 4 5 of the Second Amendment, because if it didn't, what the government's position would be, if it doesn't cover commercial 6 7 purchase, then they could ban all commercial purchase. If the conduct at issue isn't within the plain text 8 9 of the Second Amendment, then nothing else matters. 10 could ban all gun purchases, regardless of source, and then 11 that would eliminate the ability to keep arms, because no one 12 could pass them down, gift them, sell them, maybe make them. 13 But that's somewhat of a digression. 14 If you don't mind, I'm going to go back to the 15 government's original point about standing, first of all. 16 The basic requirements for a finding of standing, for 17 the plaintiffs to have standing, are that they must have 18 suffered an injury in fact, and that includes an invasion of a 19 legally protected interest which is concrete and 20 particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or 21 hypothetical. That's the first requirement. 22 The second requirement is that there must be a 23 casual -- or causal, I'm sorry, causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and it must be likely 24 25 the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

1 the Lujan decision from the Supreme Court. 2 It's our position that we've satisfied all those 3 three and that the crux of the government's argument is more to the merits of the argument, not on the standing itself. 4 5 And with that, we would say --THE COURT: Well, they say you're not part of "the 6 7 people" in your category. 18 to 21 is not part of "the people" because the age of majority was 21 back in those days. 8 9 MR. HARDING: I believe that is what the government's 10 position is --11 THE COURT: It's what they said. 12 MR. HARDING: -- when it comes down to it, because if they were within "the people," then they're clearly within the 13 14 plain text and there is no analogue to the time went it comes 15 to this issue. There are other analogues that we could assess 16 and try to distinguish or compare. 17 THE COURT: Run that up the flagpole again. 18 MR. HARDING: There are plenty of other restrictions that existed in 1791, as the Court noted, that we could 19 20 compare this to, but we don't find it to be analogous. There 21 is no age ban on the purchase. 22 THE COURT: What restrictions existed in 1791 on the 23 purchase of guns? 24 MR. HARDING: Those that we reference that -- or, 25 obviously, there were many that wouldn't stand scrutiny today,

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whether it be based on race or religion, for example. were bans on Catholics owning firearms or Native Americans or the black population. I'm not actually familiar with tons of them regarding women not being able to own them. But those all existed. But there were also felons couldn't own them in many regards. Those were -- failed the loyalty tests. That's actually something that we think is partially relevant for the Court's consideration. That is, after the Revolutionary War, if you were considered to be a British loyalist -- and there was a method by which they would determine one was or was not a loyalist. It wasn't just a bill of attainder where they just wrote up people's names. They went through a process and determined if you were or were not a loyalist. Anyone over the age of 18 -- and that's a pivotal thing to consider at the time of 1791. Anyone -- not a federal law, but in many states, if you were over 18 and you were considered a loyalist to the Crown, you couldn't own firearms. Now, to us, that would suggest if you were over 18 you could have the firearms. But those are the only restrictions that we're really aware of --THE COURT: Catholics, felons, blacks, people who had not signed loyalty oaths if they were over 18. MR. HARDING: Native Americans as well. I'm not

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   sure -- I can't speak with conviction on whether or not there
2
   were restrictions on women.
 3
            THE COURT: The only one that related to age was the
   loyalty oath one.
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            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: And why was that?
 6
7
            MR. HARDING: Why is that the only one that relates
8
   to age?
9
            THE COURT: Why did the loyalty oath provision have
10
   an age provision in it?
11
            MR. HARDING: Without having explicit legislative
12
   history, I don't want to speak out of hand. But I do think
13
   it's fair to assume, based on the time and the other laws at
14
   issue, that it was because any able-bodied male adult over the
15
   age of 18 was also part of the militias in the many states at
16
   the time, or expected to be.
17
            THE COURT: So you didn't want somebody who wasn't
18
   loyal serving in the militia?
19
            MR. HARDING: Correct. It would be, essentially,
20
   like an enemy combatant in today's context.
21
            THE COURT: Do you have any authority that I can cite
22
   that explains that that age -- that aspect of that age -- of
23
   that restriction is tied to the militia laws?
24
            MR. HARDING:
                          The loyalty tests component -- this is
25
   what we cite, Your Honor: We cite the NRA case, which is
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1
   obviously not a firsthand source of the issue, but we cite
 2
          And we also cite --
   that.
 3
            THE COURT: Where?
            MR. HARDING: At page 343.
 4
 5
            THE COURT: No, where do you cite it?
 6
            MR. HARDING: Oh, I apologize. On page 17 of the
7
   plaintiffs' response in opposition.
8
            THE COURT: Page 17.
            MR. HARDING: Of document 27. This is where we kind
9
10
   of get into the comparisons of what was and wasn't on the
   books at the time. We state --
11
12
            THE COURT: Okay. "The only Founding-era regulations
13
   that could compare to the laws at issue were those for
14
    'Loyalists to the Crown,' in that they applied to law-abiding,
15
   able-bodied adult citizens absent consideration of race,
16
   ethnicity, national origin, or religion, but even the 'Loyalty
17
   Test' regulations contradict the government's position in this
18
   case."
19
            "Loyalty oaths [sic] were applicable to persons
20
    'above 18 and stated that those who did not swear allegiance
21
   would be disarmed' -- 18-year-olds were considered to have
22
   rights, even if they were equally subject to being restricted
23
   with other suspect class members."
24
            I don't see that there's anything that shows that the
25
   18-year-old provision even applies in that statement.
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1 there some subsequent statement that mentions it? 2 MR. HARDING: I'm not sure I am clear on the Court's 3 question about --THE COURT: All right. Let's try again. 4 5 MR. HARDING: Sure. 6 THE COURT: You've made the argument that among the 7 restrictions were the following who could not -- were 8 restricted from owning guns: Catholics, felons, black people, 9 Native Americans, and those who would not sign loyalty oaths, 10 if they were over 18. And I asked you, does that over the 18, 11 does the 18 age have anything to do -- where does it come 12 And you said that the tie would be to militia service 13 at age 18. Where on page 17 do you talk about that? And you 14 said you cited some case, and I don't see any case cited 15 there. 16 MR. HARDING: Oh, my apologies, Your Honor. 17 didn't get into the fact that they were or were not -- that's 18 why I was saying we can draw the conclusion. At the beginning of the Court's question, I note that we don't explicitly have 19 20 a case talking about why that age, and, of course, we don't 21 have the legislative history from the various states at that 22 time. THE COURT: Do you have loyalty oath restrictions? 23 MR. HARDING: They're cited in the -- they're cited 24 25 within the authority we --

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THE COURT: You mean they're cited within NRA?
 1
            MR. HARDING: And within the Colonial Firearm
 2
 3
   Regulation article that is in the middle of that second
   paragraph.
 4
 5
            THE COURT: I see. But you don't know what they say
   about the age? Where the age --
 6
7
            MR. HARDING: Well, in Massachusetts -- I mean, in
8
   some states it was actually lower than 18.
9
            THE COURT: How much lower than 18?
10
            MR. HARDING: In Massachusetts, it was 16.
11
            THE COURT: What was 16?
12
            MR. HARDING: If you were over 16 and couldn't
13
   satisfy the loyalty oath, they would disarm you. Other
14
   states it was 18.
15
            THE COURT: Is that because their militia service was
16
   16 at the time of the loyalty oath statute?
17
            MR. HARDING: We believe that is the reason, Your
18
   Honor.
           But I don't have anything specifically to put before
19
   the Court to say that's exactly why.
20
            THE COURT: You might need to be doing that, since it
21
   would seem to me to be a highly relevant aspect of analysis
22
   here.
23
            MR. HARDING: Well, insofar as the loyalty oath
   component is even relevant, we don't find it to be analogous
24
25
   to the issue before the Court. And that's our real point, is
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there isn't an analogue from 1791 of an age-based barrier to the procurement of a handgun.

THE COURT: What difference does it make if there's an age-based procurement issue to owning or possessing a rifle or a musket because of the loyalty oath provision? You see the point is, the way you're arguing it, the way -- is that the loyalty oath provision is an age-based restriction. And I asked you how you deal with that restriction. You say, "Well, it's tied to the militia." It makes sense that that's the case, even if some state had a 16-year-old threshold for the loyalty oath state, if that state also had 16 years old at the militia. Because what you don't want is, you don't want people bearing arms if they're going to be inside your defense mechanism. Quisling, so to speak.

Now you're twist -- shifting and talking about another aspect of the restriction, whether it's a restriction to purchase or to possess, and I don't see that that's what it's being cited for. In other words, you-all have thrown out something here that you haven't run to ground. And I need it run to ground because I think it is relevant. It may not be dispositive, but it certainly looks to me like it's relevant.

MR. HARDING: Your Honor, the only reason we even cite the loyalty tests is because it contains a presumption that those over the threshold age do have the right to procure, keep, and have these firearms, regardless if they're

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21 or not, because -- that's why we're citing it. That's the only reason we're citing it, is because when you read these laws at the time, whether they're in Massachusetts or Pennsylvania, it presumes that anyone over the age does have the unfettered right unless they're a loyalist to the Crown. So it's not that we're citing it as an age-based restriction as an analogue; we're actually just citing it as a restriction that was on the books at the time that counters the idea that there was an analogue. Had there been an analogue, they wouldn't need the loyalty test. They would have just said, "Anyone who's not 21 can't have the firearms." The conduct at issue in that loyalty test issue is the loyalty to the Crown, not the age. The age is only relevant because it presumes that there's an armed class of people, that being those over the threshold age, who are otherwise armed. And so we would say that it errs on what Bruen considered, and that is the Second Amendment memorializes a preexisting right. THE COURT: Has any other court ever held that the Bruen formulation of the standard -- "We reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment is as follows." And I have read it and read it and read it; you-all know what Is there any other court that says that the conduct covered by the plain text that then animates the presumption of protection and the obligation of the government to explain

consistency with the Nation's historical tradition was the 1 2 conduct -- was, as is referred to in Bruen, you say, 3 possessing a handgun outside the home? Is there any other court that defines that conduct in discussing Bruen? Any law 4 5 review article, anybody of authority who says that the conduct at issue in Bruen, what they're talking about, possessing a 6 7 handgun outside the home, and it was covered by the provision of the Second Amendment that we're talking about here? 8 9 Nobody cites anything. You say that McCraw stands 10 for that proposition, that it -- it covers the conduct here. 11 But it involved purchasing -- it involved concealed carry. So here, the conduct has to be the purchasing of previously-owned 12 firearms from a federally licensed firearm dealer, you say. 13 Is there anybody anywhere who has -- who has written 14 15 to give support to that version of what conduct is 16 specifically covered by the Second Amendment? Any case, any 17 treatise, any law review article? 18 MR. HARDING: There are -- yes, there are cases post Bruen that are not cited here because of their relative 19 20 recency. I have to qualify that. But the idea that the 21 commercial transaction generally, commercial procurement of firearms is within the plain text --22 23 THE COURT: How many cases are there that you haven't 24 cited to me, that neither one of you have cited to me? 25 MR. HARDING: Post Bruen, I believe that there are at

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   least two or three.
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            THE COURT: Let's have the citation, and we'll look
 3
   them up when I take my recess.
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. Happy to do so.
 4
 5
            THE COURT: I want them now, so when we take a
   recess, we can look them up.
 6
7
            MR. HARDING: Okay.
8
            THE COURT: We're going to take a recess in a few
9
   minutes.
10
            MR. HARDING: Okay.
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            THE COURT: You say there are two or three more
12
   cases.
            MR. HARDING: I don't have them before us about
13
14
   the --
            THE COURT: You may not have them, but do you have
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16
   the citations?
17
            MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor. They're not in our
18
   briefs, and it's not part of a supplemental brief.
19
            THE COURT: Do you have them available to you?
20
            MR. HARDING: I could get them during a recess, but I
21
   don't have --
22
            THE COURT: Where are you going to get them?
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            MR. HARDING: I would have to access my computer,
24
   but --
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            THE COURT: Where is that?
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MR. HARDING: It's just parked outside.
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            THE COURT: Well, you know you can bring your
 3
   computer in, if you get permission.
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. I was made aware of
 4
 5
   that. I didn't think that --
 6
            THE COURT: Isn't it on the website? Doesn't it tell
7
   you that on the website, that if you get permission, you can
8
   bring your computer in? It's different than your hand
9
   phone -- handgun -- your phone.
10
            MR. HARDING: Correct. I do believe you can move
11
   to -- I know that you can do that, Your Honor. I apologize.
12
            THE COURT: How long will it take you to get me those
13
   cases?
14
            MR. HARDING: I could get it during the Court's
15
   recess.
            THE COURT: Okay. So you're parked not too far away?
16
17
            MR. HARDING: Correct, Your Honor. I'm next to the
18
   Virginia Supreme Court.
            THE COURT: And you're fast?
19
20
            MR. HARDING: I will jog my fastest.
21
            THE COURT: We're going to take a recess at this
22
   time.
          I want those cases; you go get them, get the citation.
23
            MR. HARDING: Yes.
24
            THE COURT: Your computer will work somewhere, I take
25
   it?
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1
            MR. HARDING: Yes.
2
            THE COURT: You get Ms. Maloney's e-mail, or whatever
 3
   she's willing to share with you, a court e-mail, and get it
   here, the citations, so we can read it during a recess. We're
 4
 5
   going to take a lunch recess at this time, and we can get
   started on that process. We will resume -- that will give you
 6
7
   time to get some lunch too, so 1:00 o'clock, give you time to
   get something to eat, will it?
8
9
            MR. HARDING: Yes.
10
            MR. HAMBRICK: Yes.
11
            THE COURT: Okay.
12
            MR. HARDING: Thank you, Your Honor.
         (Recess taken from 11:47 a.m. until 1:19 p.m.)
13
14
            THE COURT: All right. I was provided with a case
15
   from United States versus Quiroz, Q-U-I-R-O-Z, out of the
16
   Western District of Texas, and you've given copies to the
17
   other side. It's 2022 U.S. District, Lexis 168329 and 2022 WL
   4352482.
18
            And then the government gave me United States versus
19
   Porter out of the Southern District of West Virginia,
20
21
   January 5, 2023, 2023 WL 113739. And another one, Reed, I
22
   think it is. Is it Reeves or --
23
            MR. HAMBRICK: United States v. King, Your Honor.
            THE COURT: King. King. 2022 WL 17668454, Eastern
24
25
   District of Pennsylvania. Okay. All right.
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1 MR. HARDING: Your Honor, we just want to note that 2 we also brought the Court's attention to the --3 THE COURT: Can you speak up? MR. HARDING: Yes. We also want to bring the Court's 4 5 attention to the Reese case that I believe the Court was referring to; we cited that as well. I believe you may have 6 7 already had that printed off and available, but just want to call your attention to that. 8 9 THE COURT: In what way do you want to call --10 MR. HARDING: So the Reese decision is actually the 11 most applicable decision for the Court's question about the 12 plain text issue concerning the conduct in this case. 13 Reese decision ultimately ruled on the merits in favor of the 14 government's position on the exact same statute and laws at 15 issue, but prior to making that finding, it did find that the 16 conduct at issue, the purchase of the firearm by those under 17 21 did fall within the plain text of the Second Amendment. 18 And that's cited at -- well, it's page 20 of Lexis. But insofar as it's -- that's the closest of all the four cases 19 20 that have been provided that specifically address the laws at 21 issue in this case. 22 I'll also note that the Quiroz decision that 23 plaintiffs provided --24 THE COURT: Well, where do they find the conduct fits 25 within the constitutional language?

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MR. HARDING: On page -- for Reese, for the Reese
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   decision, on page --
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            THE COURT: I have the Westlaw version up here.
            MR. HARDING: I can tell you what portion of the
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         It's under Section IV, Subsection A. So if you go to
   Section IV, Subsection A, it's says, "Facial Challenge-Count
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   I."
            THE COURT: Wait just a minute.
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            MR. HARDING: And then if you go to the second
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   paragraph of that subsection --
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            THE COURT: So he says that you have to answer
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   whether the Second Amendment's plain text protects the ability
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   of 18- to 20-year-olds to directly purchase handguns from
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   FFLs. And then section what?
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            MR. HARDING: It's section IV, subsection A, so --
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   section IV, subsection A of the opinion, in the second
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   paragraph --
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            THE COURT: The paragraph begins, "With respect to
   the first question"?
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            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. And the last --
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   towards the bottom of that paragraph.
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            THE COURT: It says they do not -- "the statute and
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   regulations" -- which are the ones at issue here, right?
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            MR. HARDING: Yes.
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            THE COURT: -- "do not explicitly restrict the rights
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1 of 18- to 20-year-olds to 'keep and bear arms,' as they do not 2 restrict this age group from owning, possessing, or carrying 3 handguns." MR. HARDING: Correct. And we're not citing this 4 5 case for the outcome as much as the issue of does the plain text apply to the conduct. 6 7 THE COURT: Where do they hold that? 8 MR. HARDING: At the end of the paragraph that the 9 Court just read from, there's a sentence that starts with the 10 words "Out of an abundance of caution" --11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. HARDING: -- "the Court will assume that the 13 statute and regulations at issue proscribe conduct covered by 14 the plain text of the Second Amendment." 15 THE COURT: Right. They assume that without deciding 16 They don't decide it. it. 17 MR. HARDING: Well, they don't -- what they've done 18 is they've taken the Fifth Circuit's preBruen precedent, and then applying it post Bruen, you know, erring on the side of 19 20 caution they do proceed to review it after having found that 21 it's conduct within the plain text of the Second Amendment. They wouldn't have made it to their final outcome had they 22 23 not. I mean, if it's outside of the plain text --24 THE COURT: If I assume something for purposes of 25 litigation, I don't decide it. I just assume that the

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position is established, and then I go on to decide the case on another basis. That looks to me like what happened here in Reese. It's correct if they had not made the assumption, they couldn't have gone where they went. That's true. MR. HARDING: Again, I would just point to the Reese case because that's the closest one to the laws at issue in this case. It's the exact same conduct. Now, we do believe that the Quiroz decision, which did explicitly have a finding --THE COURT: The what decision? MR. HARDING: The United States against Quiroz. THE COURT: Oh, the one from Texas. MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Where does it help you? MR. HARDING: In that case, the court explicitly found that the Second Amendment's plain text does cover the receipt of a firearm, meaning the procurement, the receipt of a firearm and the Constitution presumptively protects such conduct. So we argue that receipt encompasses commercial or private procurement. Now, I'll distinguish these two from the King and the Porter decision that the government has supplied. Both of those cases specifically are dealing with the sale or the relinquishment of a firearm in a regulated transaction versus the procurement and the purchase. We do not contest that the

1 sale in this case is what is the right that -- the conduct 2 that's being targeted by our clients. Our clients are not 3 active sellers. In fact, the Fourth Circuit in the Hirschfeld against 4 5 ATF case that was preBruen, on pages 416 through 418, explicitly goes into distinguishing how the procurement or, in 6 7 this case, the purchase is dispositively different than the regulations on the sales, on the commercial sales. 8 9 So the Porter and King decision, both of them --THE COURT: How does Hirschfeld do that? 10 MR. HARDING: It does that on pages 416 through 418. 11 12 THE COURT: And how? 13 MR. HARDING: Well, it's a relatively lengthy 14 analysis, but the court goes into explaining that -- on page 15 417, the court says, "Here, the substance of the challenged 16 law dictates that they are a functional prohibition on buyers, 17 not a mere condition or qualification on sellers. They ban an 18 entire group of adult, law-abiding citizens from purchasing handguns from licensed dealers, substantially burdening the 19 20 group's rights. The category of conditions and qualifications on commercial sales referenced in Heller is limited as Hosford 21 highlights," Hosford is a Fourth Circuit case, "to laws that 22 23 place conditions and qualifications on the seller, like 24 licensing. It does not encompass a ban on a class of people seeking to purchase handguns from a qualified seller." 25

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            So we just want to note that there's a distinction
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   between the sale and the purchase. We believe that the
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   conduct here falls within the receiving that was discussed in
   the Quiroz decision. We think that the assumption that the
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   Reese court made was the correct assumption, and we would ask
   the Court to adopt the same outcome. When it comes to this
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   issue of is the conduct in the plain text, we would ask this
   Court to similarly interpret the Hirschfeld decision post
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   Bruen and find that this conduct is within the plain text.
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            Once the conduct is deemed to be within the plain
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   text, then the issue is the analogue.
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            THE COURT: Excuse me just a minute. Do you agree
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   with Mr. Clendenen's position that if I find the conduct is
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   not within the plain text of the Second Amendment, then the
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   analysis is over?
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            MR. HARDING: From a Second Amendment standpoint --
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            THE COURT: From a Second Amendment -- from your
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   Second Amendment claim.
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            MR. HARDING: If the conduct is outside of the plain
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   text of the Second Amendment --
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            THE COURT: Then you never get to studying the
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   analogues and see what the history shows, right?
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            MR. HARDING: Correct.
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            THE COURT:
                       Right?
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            MR. HARDING: Correct. At that point, we would get
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1 to a due process review, and without --2 THE COURT: You mean at that point you would be 3 depending solely on the equal protection claim, Fifth Amendment claim? 4 MR. HARDING: Well, the due process claim of the 5 Fifth Amendment, yes, Your Honor. Well, we also argued and 6 7 we've raised the fact that it doesn't even satisfy a rational basis. And we're not prepared to go there yet, but -- as far 8 9 as the presentation to the Court, I do want to go more into 10 the Second Amendment inquiry. But if the conduct, meaning the 11 procurement, by these individuals of this handgun, which is an 12 outright ban on the purchase of the handgun, particularly new 13 handguns, but the purchase of the handgun from a qualified 14 dealer is outside of the scope of the plain text of the Second 15 amendment, then, yes, the Second Amendment inquiry would stop. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. HARDING: But moving on in the sense that the 18 conduct, we believe that the conduct is within the scope, then it becomes is there an analogue to 1791 or the founding --19 20 THE COURT: And then the burden to prove consistency 21 is on the government at that point under Bruen; is that right? 22 MR. HARDING: That's correct, Your Honor. And to 23 that end, I want to note that in United States against 24 Chester, which, again, is a preBruen Fourth Circuit case, and 25 it was cited in Hirschfeld, the Court said in the face of

historical silence or ambiguity, we assume conduct is 1 2 protected. 3 So without pointing to something to say that this type of conduct was barred, we would ask for the Court to 4 5 follow the Chester decision and the Hirschfeld reference to that decision, and point to the fact that there is nothing to 6 7 say that this conduct is outside of the plain text. Again, 8 the Quiroz, Texas decision, finds that the receipt is 9 inherently embedded within the concept of keep. Keep and bear 10 requires the ability to procure. One cannot keep without 11 having. 12 But moving to the aspect of, okay, once it's 13 established that the conduct is within the plain text and the 14 burden shifting to the government to point to a historical 15 analogue, we would point that at that point it's no longer 16 just the conduct that is being regulated, but it's a 17 categorical based ban. That's really where the analogues fall 18 apart. It's not that they're banning the possession of a 19 handgun by the plaintiffs altogether. It's not that they are 20 banning the purchase of firearms from FFLs altogether. 21 not -- in fact, the handgun has been elevated post Heller as a form of firearm that is -- we referenced it earlier -- but the 22 23 quintessential self-defense weapon, meaning it is to be 24 recognized as the most -- I don't want to say the most 25 protected firearm, but it's inherently not a more dangerous

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firearm, meaning it's not inherently risky or dangerous or has a higher capability of being dangerous in its use versus its legitimate functions of self-defense. And that is the crux of the Second Amendment as an individual right. So it's not the commercial purchase that's --THE COURT: What does the record show about the existence vel non of handguns in or around 1791? MR. HARDING: As far as pistols? THE COURT: Handguns. What other kind of handgun, is there than a pistol? A Derringer, I guess. I think a Derringer was invented much later, but I don't know. MR. HARDING: As far as historical materials reference the ability for these young people, young adults specifically in this case, but those over 18 to have access to pistols, I believe that the -- there's no legislative record about the issue from 1791. But I think the historical references in some of these citations in our brief referenced the fact that they would have expected these young men to have their own firearms. Whether they be pistols or muskets is relatively immaterial at this --THE COURT: Is it really? Because back in those days if you have a pistol and I have a musket, you can't get close enough -- I can knock you off before you get close enough to me to use the pistol. So maybe firearms just means muskets. MR. HARDING: Well, the Heller decision found that

1 the individual right, fundamental liberty of keeping and 2 bearing firearms, particularly as a means of self-defense, and 3 then highlighting the handgun as the quintessential self-defense weapon, I think that would contradict the idea 4 5 that the musket is the heightened protected firearm, particularly for the purpose, and that is self-defense, 6 7 because closer range would logically be the style of firearm to be used in a self-defensive manner. 8 THE COURT: Back in those days firearms, pistols were 9 10 used for what do you think? 11 MR. HARDING: An array of things. I mean, it could 12 be used to --13 THE COURT: Mostly they were used for dueling, 14 weren't they? That's not self-defense. 15 MR. HARDING: I think that the pistol was certainly 16 the firearm of choice in a duel, but I don't think the 17 majority of the use of the pistol was during a duel. I think 18 pistols were probably used in the same fashion that handguns are today, and that is they're kept in the home, they're kept 19 20 to --THE COURT: But the pistols in 1791, they used balls, 21 22 not bullets, didn't they? 23 MR. HARDING: Sure. Correct. 24 The reason I'm even focusing on the handgun component 25 versus the long guns is that the -- the laws at issue, there

1 is no analogue for and there are no other purported bans on 2 the gun being accessible by this class. They can have the 3 gun. They can go out and buy it from somewhere else. So it's not as if the government can rely on the fact that this 4 5 firearm is so inherently dangerous to these people, therefore, we're going to ban it. In fact, if you look at the stated 6 7 legislative purpose in 1968, that being to reduce the 8 clandestine procurement of firearms, the clandestine 9 procurement is acting outside of the law. That's what 10 clandestine would mean in that sense, and that is you're doing 11 it unlawfully. 12 Yet, what they're doing, what the code does is it 13 inherently regulates these young men and women to a system 14 that is outside of the law, purely to the private sector where 15 there are no forms of due diligence to determine background check, you know, the criminality, the mental health history, 16 17 any other substance abuse issues, matters that -- you know, 18 domestic violence issues, things that have historically 19 resulted in someone not being able to access the firearm. None of that --20 THE COURT: How does all of that fit into the Second 21 22 Amendment analysis? I can understand the argument that by 23 structuring a system that precludes purchase from a legitimate 24 dealer where you can get a warranty, and there's a record of it, and all those salvatory purposes are met but allows you to 25

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get them on the black market or as a gift makes utterly no sense. No rational -- it's not a rational basis. reasonable. I can understand that argument, but what does it have to do with the Second Amendment part of it? MR. HARDING: Thank you for clarifying that. You're But from a Second Amendment standpoint, at least, we think it's actually relevant as well, because what we have here, once the Court recognizes that the plain text applies to the purchase or the procurement, we have a -- the whole regulation is just a categorical ban based on age. It's not a ban based on the gun. It's not a ban based on the source of the gun. It is a ban based on the categorical ban without any individualized finding of any type of disqualifying conduct to a class of law-abiding adult citizens. And that's where the government's position in this case is the same as the NRA's position in the -- or the court's decision in the NRA case, and that is that these class of people fall -- these class -- or the plaintiffs and their class fall outside of "the people." That's their position. And their position is, well, they were minors in 1791, and even though adulthood or the age of majority has shifted since then, these individuals should be relegated to a second-class status, even though the laws recognize them as a member of the people. There are no other variables that these young men and young women in the class have that would render

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them outside of "the people." They are universally allowed suffrage through Article 26, when the Constitution was amended to give them the federal right, the universal federal right to vote. THE COURT: That's not back at the founding. MR. HARDING: No, Your Honor, but at the time --THE COURT: Why should we decide the meaning of one word in a constitutional provision with reference to historical analogues at the time of the founding and decide another part of the words in the same statute with relevance to today and more current law and such analogues? MR. HARDING: It's our position that the government is trying to have it two different ways, and they can't have it either way, and that is, in 1791, if their position is these people -- only adults have the right to the Second Amendment, only adults are the classification that can fall within that, our position is fine, have that position. adulthood is different. Adulthood is the same, meaning if they meant adults in 1791, we can look to today's standards, at today's inquiry, and say who are the adults and who are not the adults, and that is the same context. And in today's inquiry, they are adults. In 1791, they were minors or infants, depending on how you classified the term. The government's entire case is because they had

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guardians, they were not fully emancipated adults in 1791. Nothing has changed since. But the fact of the matter is the Second Amendment can keep the same meaning in 1791 and the plaintiffs still succeed. Adulthood is the same. It's just who it applies to is different. In that regard, we would say that the government's reliance on the age of majority in 1791 being the primary factor, that's fine. The issue is the age of majority is not 21. The age of majority is 18. And an 18-year-old today is affirmatively a member of "the people" based on the same factors at issue in 1791. They can vote, they can serve, they have no legal guardian, they can pay taxes, enter into contract. They're not otherwise burdened by any other -- any other body. The same wasn't in 1791. In 1791, there were various factors that an 18-, 19-, 20-year-old would have had to consider and they weren't fully legally emancipated. adulthood is the same. Now, if the Court were to find that that doesn't really matter, that adulthood isn't the shifting issue, that it's really the actual age, 18, 19, 20, meaning let's strip majority and minority from the review, then the government's position also fails because of all the references to the militia laws at issue, the lack of any age restriction-based bans at that time.

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And the government continues to cite this argument that we argue for too much, that we're arguing for all minors. We're not arguing for any minors to get firearms in this case. These are all adults. So the aspect of, well, a six-year-old could do it or a ten-year-old could do it, we're not here today, and, honestly, we're not trying to make that argument, and we don't necessarily think it needs to be made, because insofar as the state does have some role in determining when rights fully vest, the age of adulthood is that threshold, and that age of adulthood has changed pursuant to the will of the people, and that was through Article 26, which gave them universal suffrage, and through the Selective Services causes that require these young men to enlist. Whether they get drafted --THE COURT: The key to adulthood is whether you're among the people? MR. HARDING: No, we would argue that "the people" is more expansive than "adulthood." But insofar as your civic engagement, your act of participation in body populous as a citizen is fully vested at 18, insofar as the eyes of the federal --THE COURT: Now? MR. HARDING: I'm sorry? THE COURT: Now?

1 MR. HARDING: Yes. 2 THE COURT: Well, I guess we're back to my first 3 question and, that is, intellectually, how does one justify going back in time and using historical analogues to interpret 4 5 one part of a constitutional provision and then using today's situation to interpret another part of the same constitutional 6 7 amendment? How can you do that? What authority is there to do that? 8 9 MR. HARDING: I guess to clarify our position on that 10 question is, the government's position is adulthood, age of 11 majority, is the threshold issue in 1791 as to when these 12 rights vest. Our position is though the number might have 13 changed on adulthood, the state has still established adult --14 it's the same inquiry. It's not a different inquiry. It's just we're not couching adulthood in 1791; it's here today. 15 16 mean, adulthood can change. Insofar as the state wants to 17 recognize a member -- someone as a fully vested, fully 18 emancipated, fully independent member of society, the state has done that. 19 20 So having a 1791 inquiry versus a more modern review, 21 I think we can sit here and look at 1791 and say -- and this is even under the government's own argument -- "Who did they 22 23 want to have firearms?" And the government's position is not 24 the minors, certainly not the minors. The minors aren't the 25 ones to have the firearms. That's fine. If that's the case

1 they want to present, minors aren't the ones at issue here. 2 That's what I'm trying to say. If adulthood is the 3 distinguishing factor, we have to look at it at the time of today. 4 5 Now, if they want to look at the nominal age itself 6 rather than the classification of minor versus adult, the 7 argument still falls because there were no bans based on age at that time, no categorical bans especially, or just 8 9 outright, and that goes back to the loyalty test reference. 10 Those laws were presuming that 16 or 18, depending on what 11 state, would have access to these firearms, and then if they 12 failed the loyalty test, they would be disarmed, right? And so looking at 1791, no age-based restrictions, no 13 14 categorical-based restrictions on the books. Presuming these 15 young people, even though they were minors, presuming them to 16 be a part of the militia, they're inherently part of the 17 people at large and they're not banned. In fact, the Court 18 referenced it earlier, there were a lot of categories that were, I quess, considered outside of "the people" at that 19 20 time. And things have changed since as well. Finally -- well, I don't want to say "finally." But 21 if the founders wanted to include an age-based restriction, 22 23 they knew how to do so. The body of the Constitution in 24 Article 1 and Article 2 put age-based restrictions and 25 classifications on the right to run for the House of

1 Representatives at 25; 30 to run for the U.S. senate; 35 to 2 run for president. If the people or Congress wanted to add an 3 age-based restriction on the right to exercise the Second Amendment, then they knew how to do so as seen by Article 26, 4 5 which is a reference to age for universal suffrage for voting, for federal purposes, at 18. 6 7 The Constitution is silent when it comes to an 8 age-based restriction at all on the Second Amendment. And 9 insofar as the people are concerned, there is not one variable 10 that the government can point to to these young men and the 11 young women in the class that would remove them from the 12 people but for the fact that they weren't adults in 1791. 13 Yet, that had nothing to do with what the Second 14 Amendment was intended for. And because it incorporates and 15 encompasses a preexisting right -- that's what Bruen has 16 found; it's what the Hirschfeld decision found; it's what 17 Heller recognizes, it's an individual preexisting right -- one 18 has to take a step back and think what limitation --19 THE COURT: There is a preexisting right? MR. HARDING: To be able to defend oneself through 20 21 the keeping and bearing of arms, yes. Bruen and Heller have 22 found as much, preexisting the Second Amendment's ratification. 23 24 And so then we have to sit there and think, "Okay. 25 If it's preexisting, how did the founders expect it to be

exercised prior to the ratification of the Second Amendment," 1 2 meaning prior to that? And there again, the government isn't 3 able to point to any analogue that's disarming a categorical class of the exact same people who would be called to arms to 4 5 use the firearms to defend the country in the first place. And if you look at some of the founders and the 6 7 drafters of the Constitution themselves, they would have fallen within this age class at the time of the Revolutionary 8 9 War. They're the exact members of the militia who would have 10 been called to arms. 11 THE COURT: Do we have proof of that in the record? 12 MR. HARDING: In the briefing, Your Honor, I believe 13 there's references to Madison having been -- I'm trying to 14 find the exact age, but they were -- I'm relatively sure 15 Madison would have fallen within that age bracket at that time 16 of the Revolutionary War. 17 THE COURT: 18 to 20? 18 MR. HARDING: 18 to 21, I believe he would have 19 fallen within that age range. 20 THE COURT: Do we have any proof of that? See, I have to consider what's in the record. 21 22 MR. HARDING: Sure. 23 THE COURT: I have to have some authority for 24 deciding something. 25 MR. HARDING: I'm trying to find where we referenced

1 the ages of some of the founders in our briefing. 2 not in our --3 THE COURT: Franklin was 81 when he signed the Declaration of Independence, which was considerably before 4 5 '91, so he wasn't in the militia. John Hancock was an older 6 man. 7 MR. HARDING: Yeah. I do recall Madison was 8 relatively young at the time of the Revolutionary War, though. 9 And I think -- I don't know if he would have been 18. 10 might have been --11 THE COURT: I don't know that they were -- any of 12 them were 18. 13 MR. HARDING: He might have been in his early 20s. 14 But the point being is they clearly were relying on thousands and thousands of young men under the age of 21 when advancing 15 16 their militias. They clearly considered these young men and 17 the body at large to be included because of the reason why we 18 have the Second Amendment, not just as the individual right to 19 defend oneself, but even the more collective aspect of it, of 20 calling forth a defense mechanism. These were -- these were 21 the exact body that was relied upon at that time to get us to 22 the point of the founding. 23 So it would have been counterintuitive to think that 24 these people are outside of the scope of the Second Amendment. 25 In fact, if anything, they're the exact people, even

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worst-case scenario. They're the exact type of people that were being protected by the Second Amendment, because this was the body that was being called to arms. THE COURT: All right. MR. HARDING: Finally, again, these firearms aren't unusually dangerous; therefore, we can't point to the firearms being outside of the scope. And it's not a presumptively lawful, long-standing restriction. This isn't something that has been around, such as the ban on felon possession or those found with maybe mental illness or those who were found to be threats to the state at large. This was brought in in 1968. And, yes, it was in response to 1960s gun violence. record -- I believe the legislative history that the government provided, at least some of legislative history around the passage of this, referenced the fact that we had a president assassinated; his brother, the attorney general, had been running for president assassinated; civil rights leaders had been assassinated. Gun violence was very much on the topical mind of the country. But because it's 50-plus years old and hasn't be challenged that often doesn't mean it's presumptively lawful or that it's long-standing. It's the substance of the law that has to be reviewed. It's the how and the why that the restriction is imposed. And without any type of individualized assessment of these young men and young women, to do a categorical ban on

1 them also does bring up the equal protection argument. And I 2 do want to move to that. Insofar as age-based restrictions 3 are concerned, we do concede that the Supreme Court has referenced old-age-based restrictions on a few different 4 5 times, and has found age is not -- is not a factor for the purposes of a heightened scrutiny, a suspect or a 6 7 quasi-suspect class. We take the position that reading that statement 8 9 alone is overbroad, because the Court was not faced with this 10 issue before it at the time, and it has not been. 11 the Supreme Court, when looking at minors, which, again, this 12 case does not involve, but when it does look at minors, it has 13 found that the civil rights fully do extend regardless of age. 14 Maybe it can be curtailed in some form or fashion, but age is 15 not a barrier to having said rights. Tinker against Des 16 Moines, Planned Parenthood against Danforth. It's been 17 applied to the First Amendment, the Fourth, the Fifth, the 18 Sixth, the Eighth, and the Fourteenth. 19 THE COURT: The holding that age is not a suspect class is still the rule before this Supreme Court, isn't it, 20 21 in the Supreme Court's decision? 22 MR. HARDING: We believe that the judicial -- no, 23 Your Honor. Our position is that the narrowness that the supreme -- the constitutional avoidance principle would negate 24 25 the idea that the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled

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against us on this motion. Just because they said age is not a suspect class, we cannot rule it -- we cannot look outside of the context that they were stating that. And to extend it to the bottom end of the age rung for adults would be overbroad, and the court did not rule as much. None of the factors that are presented in this brief, in this argument, were put before the Court. And those primary factors are what aspects of a classification render members of such class to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class. And those factors are primarily whether or not there's been a history of long-standing oppression and exploitation of the members of the class. And we argue on page 21 that those classified, based on their youth, have suffered from a history of purposeful, unequal, and oppressive treatment, whether it be prior to the founding, at the time of the founding, and particularly through the draft and even to today. Then we can sit there and point to the fact that -- and we go through at length listing the various methods by which the youth have been exploited and oppressed by the political bodies at large in

Now, I know the government argues that age is not immutable, but it is immutable in the sense that the person is incapable of unilaterally changing their condition. I cannot

the state. But then we look at the fact that it is a mutable

characteristic and they are an insular minority.

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become 10 years older today. It's immutable in the sense that it is not amendable, it's not capable of any type of revision of the person who is in the class. They can't make themselves older. Now, the powers that be, meaning time, if we're fortunate enough to make it later in life, that will perhaps mute out the characteristic. But that immutable has historically always been about the possessor of the classification themselves: race, sex, gender, national origin, ethnicity. You know, religion, ironically, isn't inherently immutable; people can convert all the time. But people are protected then, arguably, under the First Amendment. In this situation, it's not mutable and they are insular minority in the sense that both historically and presently they are such a small number of the political body that they aren't capable of mobilizing against the older cohorts who have been able to vote for such a long time in order to establish an equal footing in the eyes of the law. And we've seen that, and we detail a history of that when, even prior to the draft cases, when Florida or Wisconsin was able to conscript young men between the ages of 16 up into their mid-twenties to go out and publicly build the roads. And they could pay their way of out it, but they were, effectively, drafted into public service to go build the roads.

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Now, did they have a right to vote themselves in or out of that situation? Some did; some did not.

In this case, what we have before the Court is prior to universal suffrage, in 1968, none of the members of the class before the court had that universal right to vote. So their rights were stripped from them without them having a say in the matter.

Now, the government might say, "Well, now they do have universal suffrage. They can go out and vote to give them themselves the right to go purchase the firearm from an FFL." But that's not the case, because they are insular in the sense that they have no -- they're new to the scene when it comes to the people at large, to the civic body.

And so whether it be the history of exploitation and oppression, the immutability of their characteristics, or the insular minority status, those are the fundamental factors of whether or not a class gains any form of heightened scrutiny. And it stands to reason in this case, because as the Court noted earlier, plenty of folks were not considered part of "the people" at the time. But none of those invidious and insidious categorical bans, whether based on race, religion, sex, gender, what have you, national origin, ethnicity, none of those would survive today. And even though there wasn't a categorical ban on age at the time, the government is now trying to say, "Well, they are a part of the people at large,

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it's just we're going to -- because they can vote and they can serve and they have no other limitations, but because the Supreme Court found that old-age-based restrictions have no type of protection, then we're going to relegate these young men and women to second-class citizens." And with that, if the Court were to find that the Second Amendment doesn't apply, we do believe that an equal protection analysis is appropriate. We do think this is fundamentally distinguishable from the Supreme Court's prior rulings on age-based class restrictions based on which end of the spectrum we're talking about on age. And, finally, it doesn't survive rational basis from a due process challenge. Even if the age-based restriction passes equal protection muster, we think relegating these young adults to the private sector, devoid of any type of oversight or protections as a means of undermining clandestine procurement of firearms is fundamentally irrational and can't survive even under a rational basis. THE COURT: Well, in Count One and Two, you purport to assert facial and as-applied challenges. Isn't it really just the facial challenge? MR. HARDING: Well, Your Honor, yes, we argue that it is just a facial challenge. But if this Court were to find that the plaintiffs need to show or have yet to show if

there's a clash as to what needs to be shown between the

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   government and the plaintiffs concerning parental approval,
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   for example, that's a fact we could establish at trial, if
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   need be, and prove that, as applied, our clients' parents
   aren't going to buy them the firearms. We don't think that
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   that's a pleading requirement.
            THE COURT: You don't allege that.
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            MR. HARDING: No, we don't think we have to.
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            THE COURT: Wouldn't you have to allege it to allege
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   an as-applied challenge? In other words, you measure the
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   claim against what the allegations in the complaint are and
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   if, in fact, the issue is -- if it's as an applied challenge,
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   the issue is whether the parents will or will not buy them a
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   gun and give it to them, that has to be in the complaint as
14
   the predicate for the --
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            MR. HARDING: For the as-applied challenge.
16
            THE COURT: Or as an applied challenge, don't you
17
   agree?
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            MR. HARDING: We did not plead that the parents
19
   wouldn't purchase the firearm.
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            THE COURT: I know, but don't you agree that if
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   you're going to make an as-applied challenge, the only one you
22
   have is that and you have to plead it, and you haven't pled
23
   it?
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            MR. HARDING: We have not pled that the parents
25
   haven't purchased it. We just think it's a facial -- we think
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it's a facial --
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            THE COURT: It's a facial challenge.
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            MR. HARDING: It is a facial challenge. But the
   government has raised the issue of an end-around means by
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   which one could procure the targeted firearm through a third
   party, that being the parent. We don't believe that we need
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7
   to find that. In fact, we find that condition to be
   unconstitutional as well. I mean, it's a part of the overall
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   structure that we're challenging, because these individuals
10
   are not actors of the state.
11
            If a shall-issue state and the shall-issue permits
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   are going to be struck down due to arbitrary enforcement, a
13
   parental oversight provision for emancipated adults certainly
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   is arbitrary. It's unenforceable. It's effectively
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   deputizing parents as a means of becoming a way for these
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   young men and women to access their Second Amendment right.
17
   The state cannot bestow that requirement onto an unregulated,
18
   unqualified, completely arbitrary choice of a parental
   decision for an adult. But if they --
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20
            THE COURT: So a right to drive?
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            MR. HARDING: One could argue you have the right to
22
   travel, but we're not arguing --
23
            THE COURT:
                        To drive.
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            MR. HARDING: To drive, generally? Not --
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            THE COURT: Is there a constitutional right to drive?
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            MR. HARDING: No.
                               There's not a
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   fundamental constitutional -- there's not a constitutional
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   right to a lot of age-based things: alcohol, tobacco, gaming,
   you know, renting a car at a certain age. There's plenty of
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   privileges we enjoy in a free society, but the idea that we're
   going to couch firearm procurement in the same level as a
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   myriad of other benefits, it's at odds with what the
7
   Constitution requires. It's at odds with Heller and Bruen.
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9
            THE COURT: I think I understand.
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            MR. HARDING: Yeah. Now, I don't know if the --
   right now we're still, I guess, on the motion to dismiss?
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12
            THE COURT: I thought you-all told me it was the same
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   thing.
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            MR. HARDING: It is the same thing. I just wanted to
15
   make sure from the logistical purposes of the Court. I didn't
16
   know if the Court wanted to delve into summary judgment.
17
            THE COURT: Is there something different that I need
18
   to delve into?
            MR. HARDING: No. The standards are in our briefs.
19
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            THE COURT: All right.
            MR. HARDING: With that, we'll rest, Your Honor.
21
22
            THE COURT: Mr. Clendenen, do you have anything else?
23
            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor, a few things.
24
            Good afternoon. May it please the Court. Your
25
   Honor, I did want to talk a little more about the plain text
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1 issue. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. CLENDENEN: The first point -- and a lot of this is covered in the amicus brief of the Every Town for Gun 4 5 Safety, ECF Number 26. On page 3 of that amicus brief, the amicus talks about how it's the burden of the plaintiffs to 6 7 show that the conduct falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment, when Bruen says first look to whether or not 8 9 it's covered by the plain text, and if that is so, then the 10 government has the burden to show that there's a historical 11 analogue, which suggests that that first part, the burden 12 falls on the plaintiff. So the fact that the plaintiffs haven't made any 13 14 argument, other than maybe one conclusory sentence in their 15 briefing, that the plain text covers their conduct, that should be the end of the matter, regardless of whether or not 16 17 the government has rebutted it in their briefing, since the 18 burden is on the plaintiffs. But on the plain text specifically, there's two 19 issues here. One is whether "the people" includes individuals 20 who are ages 18 to 20, and the second issue is whether or not 21 the word "keep" includes a right to purchase firearms. 22 23 On that second point, whether or not "keep" includes 24 a right to purchase, the same amicus brief, on page 4, cites 25 two district court opinions that found that -- well, found

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   that selling, and one of those cases also says purchasing
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   firearms, does not fall within the meaning of keep. And that
 3
   also the other two cases that we printed, United States
   versus --
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 5
            THE COURT: How can you keep it if you don't purchase
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   it?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: I'm sorry, what was that, Your Honor?
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            THE COURT: How can you keep it if you don't purchase
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   it?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Well, Your Honor, he can procure it
11
   from it his parents. His parents can give it to him as a
          The United States versus Porter decision --
12
13
            THE COURT: That's the only way.
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Well, it is possible to buy a
15
   secondhand handgun from --
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            THE COURT: But you said you weren't pushing that
17
   point, I thought.
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Primarily, Your Honor, the way that
19
   the --
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            THE COURT: Judge Williams put it this way: Fish or
21
   cut bait. I mean, are you going to argue that and want me to
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   decide it or not? Is the ATF really saying, "Look, the
23
   statute is saved because you can make a purchase from an
24
   unlicensed dealer"? That's what you're saying?
25
            MR. CLENDENEN: No, Your Honor. Our primary argument
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1 is that the plaintiffs can purchase it from their parents. 2 THE COURT: That's your only argument now. I told 3 you to either buy it or sell it, and you sold it. Let's go 4 on. 5 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. It is a standing 6 argument, so --7 THE COURT: Let me ask you something. MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: Why isn't the argument that you can 10 buy -- a parent could buy a gun for a child, the functional 11 equivalent of a straw purchase for a prohibited person? 12 Because here he is a prohibited person getting it the only 13 lawful way he can get it, by buying it. So it looks to me 14 like that you're really arguing that the -- that a straw 15 purchase arrangement is okay in the context of this situation, 16 to get it into the hands of an otherwise prohibited person. 17 Help me with that. 18 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, in the context of a 19 parent, yes. This is basically an exception to the ordinary 20 straw purchase rule, that a parent is allowed to do it in this instance where the only disability is that the person is under 21 22 the age of 21 but over the age of 18. 23 THE COURT: But why is the parent given that right 24 when -- if I go out and I buy it for my grandson, I'm not 25 protected. If I go out and buy it for the neighbor's son, I'm

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   not protected. Why is the parent protected? I mean, I would
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   go to jail as a straw purchaser, right? If I bought one for
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   an 18-year-old who is the young man, young woman next door, I
   like them a lot, I like -- I take them hunting with me, we go
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   shooting at the Cavalier sporting place, and I want them to
   have a handgun because I think that they travel in rough
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   circumstances sometimes and I want them to be able to protect
8
   themselves, if I buy it from a federally licensed dealer and
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   give it to them, I have effected a straw purchase to a
10
   particular person, haven't I?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --
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            THE COURT: Yes or no?
            MR. CLENDENEN: I'm not sure, to be honest.
13
                                                          I think
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   what --
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            THE COURT: Suppose this -- let's take it one step
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   further. Suppose this person, this young person comes to me
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   and says, "Sir, we are great friends. You know how much I am
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   careful with guns and respect them and know what I'm doing.
19
   need a gun to protect myself because I travel through some
20
   rough territories earning my living as a pizza delivery
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   driver. Would you buy me one? My parents won't do it. Would
22
   you do it?"
23
            "Sure. I'll do it."
24
            I've just completed a straw purchase when I do that,
25
   haven't I?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. That would be more
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   clearly not allowed.
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            THE COURT: What is it that keeps the mere status of
   parent, that keeps that very same transaction from being a
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   straw purchase, a purchase for somebody who is otherwise not
   allowed to have a gun?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, this is the balance that
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   Congress set out. The legislative history makes it clear that
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   if a parent is involved, it's okay. And the ATF opinion
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   letter spells that out more explicitly as well.
11
            THE COURT: Well, it just says it's okay. It doesn't
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   explain why. I'm looking for a rationale why -- you see, what
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   you're saying is, you're arguing a truly unusual premise -- I
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   mean the theory, and the theory is that by doing what is
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   unlawful, you can make something lawful. It's a very
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   troublesome proposition for a court to sign on to something
17
   like that.
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, historically, both in the
   firearm context and many other contexts, parents have, you
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   know, supervisory rights over their children. So ordinarily,
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   someone under 21 can't drink alcohol --
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            THE COURT: I have supervisory rights over my
   18-year-old, do I? What can I do?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: An 18-year-old child --
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            THE COURT: Living with me.
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MR. CLENDENEN: You could, for example, allow your 18-year-old child, if you're a legal guardian, to drink alcohol in your presence, even though they go can't out and buy it on their own. Historically, in the firearm context, there is precedent for this as well. There were some states at the founding that allowed 18- to 20-year-olds to be in the militia only with parent's permission. We've included a chart with those state laws. THE COURT: Right. MR. CLENDENEN: And the idea in this context, or the 1968 law, is that a parent or legal guardian knows their child and knows if that child is mature enough to own a handgun without committing crimes. So the whole point -- the whole point of not wanting a clandestine purchase of a firearm as used in the legislative history, it's clandestine from the parents. It's not a question about whether or not someone is clandestinely purchasing it from the firearm dealer; that's not the point. It's clandestine with regard to whether or not the parent knows it, because the parent is in the best position to know if that child, who's under the age of 21, is responsible and mature enough to own that kind of firearm and isn't going to go out and commit crimes with it. THE COURT: Isn't that, really, just part of an ends versus means test? I mean, one part of it; it's not the whole

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   thing.
           It's sort of the central point of one.
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I don't think it's
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   necessarily part of an ends versus means test necessarily.
   And, again, Bruen --
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            THE COURT: It will allow these people, who we don't
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   really want to have it because they're -- to have a handgun
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   because they're so -- the group has committed violent crimes,
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   they're in that category, and, yet, we'll let the parent
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   choose. And for all you know when you're enacting a law, the
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   parent could be a felon, and, in fact, it's not unusual that
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   we have cases that felon parents buy guns, give them to their
12
   offspring.
            MR. CLENDENEN: So, Your Honor, in that situation, it
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   wouldn't be allowed because the purchaser would also have a
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   disability to acquiring a firearm, if they're a convicted
16
   felon.
           So that wouldn't work if they had other disability,
17
   like, if they --
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            THE COURT: All right.
            MR. CLENDENEN: You know, if they were a habitual
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20
   drug user, for example, they're not allowed to purchase a
21
   firearm under federal law, so the same thing would apply.
22
   They wouldn't be able to purchase it and then gift it to their
23
   child. But the plaintiffs haven't alleged that their parents
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   are under any disability like that here.
25
            THE COURT: Yeah, I know.
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            MR. CLENDENEN: On the plain text point, though, so
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   one issue is whether keep includes a right to purchase. The
   other is whether or not "the people" includes 18- to
 3
   20-year-olds. Again, the Every Town for Gun Safety amicus
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   addresses this on page 4., and they cite a law review article
   specifically explaining that 18- to 20-year-olds fall outside
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7
   of "the people." And then all the cases that plaintiffs cite,
   there's no discussion rebutting that point. The McCraw case,
9
   it doesn't really go into --
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            THE COURT: What brief are you asking me to touch on
   down here?
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12
            MR. CLENDENEN: It's ECF Number 26. It's an amicus
   brief --
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14
            THE COURT: Yes.
15
            MR. CLENDENEN: -- by Every Town for Gun Safety.
16
            THE COURT: What page?
17
            MR. CLENDENEN: Page 4.
18
            THE COURT: And where?
            MR. CLENDENEN: About halfway down the first full
19
20
   paragraph.
21
            THE COURT: Beginning with what word?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: "Here, however, the question is a
   different one: whether those younger" --
23
            THE COURT: ". . . than 21 are considered part of
24
25
    'the people' covered by the Amendment's text. As recent
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1 scholarship by a leading Second Amendment historian has 2 confirmed, they are not." Citing Saul Cornell. 3 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. And none of the cases that the plaintiffs have cited really rebut that point. 4 5 THE COURT: That's just the common law age of majority question. Isn't that what it all boils down to? 6 7 MR. CLENDENEN: It is what it boils down to, yes, 8 Your Honor, but, specifically, in the context of the plain 9 text inquiry. 10 THE COURT: Anything else? 11 MR. CLENDENEN: Just a couple of points, Your Honor. 12 For the equal protection analysis, since, as we've explained, 13 age is not a suspect class, the Court would uphold the law as 14 long as rational basis is satisfied. And rational basis, as 15 the Supreme Court has said in a number of cases, a law can be 16 underinclusive and overinclusive and still pass rational basis 17 so long as there's any connection at all. 18 So the fact that, you know, it is true there's, 19 effectively, a loophole for someone under 21 to buy a 20 secondhand firearm at a gun show, and so for that reason, as Your Honor said, the law isn't perfect, basically, in 21 preventing all persons under 21 from acquiring firearms. 22 23 that doesn't matter for a rational basis review. That's, 24 basically, just a point to say that the law is underinclusive 25 in one regard, which is fine for a rational basis review.

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1 The connection (coughing) -- I'm sorry. 2 THE COURT: Do you want to go get a glass of water? 3 MR. CLENDENEN: I think I'll be fine. The connection is that Congress found there was a 4 5 heightened level of criminal activity involving firearms of people under the age of 21 around the time the statute was 6 7 passed, specifically using handguns, and so they passed a law 8 that would require -- effectively require parental permission 9 for a purchase from federally licensed firearm dealers, which 10 were the largest sellers to people in this age group. That is enough for a rational basis review. The fact that there's 11 12 loopholes doesn't really come into play. 13 THE COURT: So what you're saying is that rational 14 basis review doesn't require a rational basis. To me, it's 15 utterly irrational to say, "Well, we're not going to allow 16 18-year-olds to buy from federal firearms dealers, where, A, 17 we know who's buying it and what their background is, et 18 cetera, but their parents can sneak around and do it and give 19 it to them." So they could give it to anybody, whether the 20 person was balanced or not balanced, disciplined or not 21 disciplined, known or not known. So we don't have any --22 again, we don't know who it is because the parents are buying 23 it. 24 Or the child can go out and go to the gun shows and 25 buy from the gun show people who aren't obligated to do it.

1 We have no way of tracing it. It makes utterly no sense to do 2 that except that it provides a way for Congress to do 3 something, because it allows them to achieve an objective, which is to regulate some firearm purchases, looking like 4 5 they're doing something on the law, in the face of a problem, and doing it in a way that opens the door and invites 6 7 subterfuge itself. And to -- in order to get the -- in other words, 8 9 you're inviting these young people, 18 to 20, to use means by 10 which we can't track them, by which we don't know if they've got good guns, warranties and et cetera, and mostly that you 11 12 can't track them. What reason or rationality is there to a structure of a law like that? 13 14 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --15 THE COURT: I understand the principle you're talking about, overinclusivity, underinclusivity. I understand that, 16 17 but I've never seen it applied to something like this, where Congress actually creates a law that invites its violation of 18 19 the object it's trying to accomplish and is arguing that in court to defend that it's rational. And I'm having trouble 20 with that intellectually. Can you help me? 21 22 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, the purpose, the main 23 purpose of the statute is that it's supposed to encourage 18-24 to 20-year-olds to have their parent give permission, 25 basically, before they can buy these firearms.

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For a rational basis review, the fact that there could be a better statute written that outright prohibited gun shows and that sort thing that would achieve the purpose even better, it doesn't matter so long as the law furthers the purpose at all. THE COURT: So the theory is at least the system, irrational though it may be, gives some protection to those who are harmed by firearms fired -- used by people 18 to 20? Is that what it boils down to? MR. CLENDENEN: With the exception of the word "irrational," Your Honor, just because that's a legal term of art, basically, that is the standard. THE COURT: Well, but let me ask you this: What evidence is there in the congressional record that the crime that they're seeking to address is -- was committed by 18- to 20-year-olds? You cited something earlier, but that doesn't seem to address the ages of the people in any way that I can make any sense out of it. Do you have anything that -because that does have to do with rationality, doesn't it? MR. CLENDENEN: A few things, Your Honor. So on our memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, which is ECF-22, bottom of page 2, top of page 3, we cited, "The legislative record established that, quote, 'juveniles account for some 49 percent of the arrests for serious crimes in the United States and minors account for 64 percent of the total

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arrests in this category.'"
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            THE COURT: Let's take that for a minute. What's a
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   juvenile? What's minor? What's the definition of all that?
   It's not shown. That actually suggests that maybe they really
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   are considerably younger people than 18 to 20 and, therefore,
   wouldn't support logically a restriction on those who are 18
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7
   to 20.
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I believe --
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            THE COURT: Have you read that article?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: What was that, Your Honor?
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            THE COURT:
                        That article you cite me about the
12
   juveniles and the minors, as you just cited.
13
            MR. CLENDENEN: Oh, the Senate report?
14
            THE COURT: Yeah, the finding. Have you read to see
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   what behind that -- what data there is behind that respecting
16
   the ages of people they're talking about when they mention
17
   juveniles and minors?
18
            MR. CLENDENEN: Not recently, Your Honor.
   know that -- I'm mixing this up, I think. But I think
19
   juveniles is individuals under 18, and minors is under the age
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21
   of 21. I thought we had a footnote --
22
            THE COURT: So a big percentage of the arrests --
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   that's arrests. That doesn't get you anywhere, it just shows
24
   they've been arrested -- relates to people who aren't even in
   the category of 18 to 20. Under that theory, they're below
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18, so they're not in the category of 18 to 20. So nothing in 1 2 that finding would support the regulation of an 18- to 3 20-year-old. Now the next one is -- what is the second? What's 4 attributed to the minors? 5 MR. CLENDENEN: ". . . 'minors account for 64 percent 6 7 of total arrests in this category. Minors under the age of 21 years accounted for 35 percent of the arrests for the serious 8 9 crimes of violence including murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, ' and 21 percent of arrests for murder." 10 11 THE COURT: All right. I see. 12 I have to go back and see what kind of validity there 13 was behind that. Have you done that? What kind of validity 14 is there to that conclusion? That's a congressional 15 conclusion. 16 MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. And under rational 17 basis review --18 THE COURT: Written by some congressional staffer somewhere on the basis of something, I assume. So have you 19 20 gone back to see what the staffer wrote, whether it was 21 correct or not? 22 MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor --23 THE COURT: Have you checked the underlying authority 24 for the assertion that Congress is making there and whether 25 it's correct, because it's internally inconsistent. You tell

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me that juveniles are under 18, and then in the next breath,
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   they say minors account for 35 percent of those -- of what
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   juveniles do, so it can't be that juveniles excludes minors.
   It just is typical gobbledygook from people who are trying to
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 5
   make a point, and it doesn't stand up. So it looks to me
   like, in your situation, you have to go back and see what did
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7
   they say and do and what was really the basis for that
   conclusion.
8
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I think I might have --
9
10
            THE COURT: Is there any?
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            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I think I might have it
12
   mixed up in that either juveniles or minors specifically
13
   refers to individuals 18 to 20 and one refers to anyone under
14
   the age of 21. I don't remember, honestly, Your Honor.
15
            THE COURT: Okay.
16
            MR. CLENDENEN: I thought we had a footnote that
17
   spelled that out, but I can't find it right now.
18
            THE COURT: If there is, I didn't get it.
19
            MR. CLENDENEN: But for rational basis review, the
20
   fact that Congress made these legislative findings is
21
   sufficient. For heightened scrutiny, the Court --
22
            THE COURT: In considering rational basis, we don't
23
   consider whether there's any merit at all to the congressional
24
   finding? Suppose that you go back and look and there is
25
   nothing to offer to support that, nothing, just no proof,
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   somebody wrote it out. Are you saying we don't consider that?
2
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm not sure -- rational
 3
   basis review is a very low bar.
            THE COURT: It isn't a high bar, but I'm not quite
 4
 5
   sure it's as low as you think it is.
            All right. Anything else?
 6
7
            MR. CLENDENEN: Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any
   other questions, but otherwise --
8
9
            THE COURT: All right.
10
            MR. CLENDENEN: Thank you. Yes, Your Honor.
         (The Court and the law clerk confer.)
11
            THE COURT: Look, the linchpin of Bruen is the
12
   statement: "We reiterate that the standard for applying the
13
14
   Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second Amendment's
   plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution
15
16
   presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then
17
   justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent
   with the" -- that is, the "it" in the sentence is the
18
19
   regulation for the law -- "that it is consistent with the
   Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only
20
   then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls
21
22
   outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"
23
            In your papers, that issue is glossed over. It's
   given some treatment but not much, and it doesn't focus the
24
25
   way that some of the decisions that you've cited to me that
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aren't in the brief focus on, and some of the ones that do. 1 2 I'm told here that the conduct that is covered by the 3 text of the Second Amendment -- or the plain text of the Second Amendment in Bruen was possessing handgun outside the 4 home. Here, it's purchasers of previously-owned firearms from 5 FLFA dealers. That's federal firearms dealers. That really 6 7 isn't addressed much. None of that is addressed much in the briefs. So the construct of the analysis isn't presented 8 9 nearly as clearly in the briefs as we have framed it out in 10 the arguments today. 11 The other thing that the briefs sort of touch on, and 12 I think leave room for improvement is the discussion 13 assuming -- I assume in making this statement that the conduct 14 is covered by the plain text. It then becomes the burden on 15 the government to show what is said in the quote that I just gave you, and in order to do that, the court tells us exactly 16 17 what periods to consider and what weight to give the periods 18 of time when we're looking at the historical analysis. And in 19 particular, the government's papers focus on cases that are way out of the time zone, without recognizing what the court 20 21 in Bruen said is the validity of the usefulness of those 22 statutes and regulations. 23 So I'm generally of the view that rebriefing will 24 help make the matter clearer. So I want you to have this 25 transcript, and I want you to refile some briefs.

1 Is there any need to file anything other than --2 you-all seem to agree that the -- that if the plaintiff 3 prevails on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff will also prevail on the motion for summary judgment, because there's no 4 5 fact, no nothing to do. You're telling me this is the same thing. And if that's the case, and you haven't argued that 6 7 issue anyway, do you agree that if you lose on the motion to dismiss, you lose on the summary judgment motion? 8 9 MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor. We wouldn't even 10 really make it to summary judgment if the Court finds that we 11 don't have standing or 12(b)(6) is satisfied, so we would 12 concede that point. We would ask for leave to amend the 13 complaint, but --14 THE COURT: How would you amend it? 15 MR. HARDING: For example, if we need to expressly 16 claim that the conduct -- in the complaint, if we need to 17 allege it as a fact rather than -- I mean, I think it would be 18 a legal conclusion. But if we need to allege as a fact that 19 the conduct is within the plain text of the Second Amendment, 20 I would certainly add that. The fact that it's not beaten down as a fact in the complaint, I don't think it's necessary 21 because I think it's a legal conclusion, but we would 22 23 certainly add it. 24 THE COURT: Well, you have to think about amending 25 your complaint.

1 So he says if he loses the motion for summary 2 judgment -- I mean for 12(b)(6), he loses the motion for 3 summary judgment too. Do you say otherwise, that if you lose the motion to dismiss, you lose summary judgment? I need to 4 5 know what goes after an adverse decision against you. A decision against you, what happens then? You-all told me 6 7 there are no facts left. MR. CLENDENEN: Yes, Your Honor. If the Court 8 9 concludes that both our 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) fail, and that 10 the 12(b)(6) fails because we've lost on the merits, then the 11 plaintiffs would be entitled to summary judgment at that 12 point, yes. THE COURT: Well, they would be entitled to summary 13 14 judgment then, okay. 15 All right. Well, then just file one brief -- you 16 don't need to refile them on your motions -- and I'll treat it 17 all as subject to the agreement we just put on the record. 18 Get the transcript, and I want any citations keyed to 19 the transcript, if you need to. I want you to see what you 20 said and see what you said in response to the questions that I 21 asked, as well as what the other side said when they were boiling things down. It may help us refine things. 22 23 I'm going to issue an order telling you with more precision what I would like to have the brief focused on, but 24 25 I'm not going to restrict your ability to file the briefs.

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So now we need to determine when is the best time to
 1
2
   get your brief in quickest while it's fresh in my mind. And
 3
   if you're going to need the transcript, that, in part,
   requires us to know when the transcript can be ready. I know
 4
 5
   that the court reporter has other obligations, but you
   well-heeled government and plaintiff can order an expedited
 6
7
   transcript.
8
            What is soonest the transcript could be available,
9
   standard, expedited, or whatever else? Do you have any sense
10
   of that, given what's going on in the rest of the court?
11
            THE REPORTER: The soonest I could do is seven days.
12
            THE COURT: That would be expedited.
13
            THE REPORTER: That's expedited. And 14 days is less
14
   expedited, and 30 days is regular turnaround.
15
            THE COURT: And there's a different price for the 30,
16
   14, and 7.
17
            I'm going to let you-all talk to the court reporter
18
   about that. I would rather have your briefs sooner rather
19
   than later while it's still fresh in my mind.
         (Counsel confers.)
20
21
            THE COURT: Are you so --
22
            MR. HARDING: We were just discussing the timeline,
23
   Your Honor.
24
            THE COURT: Why don't you discuss the timeline and
25
   then --
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1
            MR. HARDING: I think we're in agreement 14 days
2
   would be preferred.
 3
            THE COURT: All right.
            MR. HAMBRICK: Your Honor, Jay Hambrick.
                                                       I think we
 4
 5
   would like to order the semi-expedited, which would give it 14
   days, and then ask for 14 days to compile the brief. Would
 6
7
   that work?
8
            THE COURT: 14 days from now is the 22nd of February,
9
   and 14 days from then is what? March the 9th? Is that
10
   right? March the 8th? The 22nd, and then one week after
   that is March the 1st, so it would be March 8th.
11
12
            MR. HAMBRICK: March the 8th, Your Honor.
13
            THE COURT: And then, in this instance, since we're
14
   really treating it as a motion to dismiss, we'll let you go
15
   first.
16
            MR. HAMBRICK: Did you want to do simultaneous and
17
   then replies one week thereafter? So we both file on
18
   March 8th, and then we each file a reply on March 15th?
19
            THE COURT: Well, you may be required to file a reply
20
   after I read them, but we can do that. March 8th and
21
   March 15th then.
22
            MR. HAMBRICK: Yes, Your Honor.
23
            Your Honor, could I just correct one thing in the
24
   record?
25
            THE COURT:
                        Sure.
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MR. HAMBRICK: This is just for plaintiff to confirm.
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2
   I think you said -- you framed the issue as the prohibition on
 3
   the sale of previously owned firearms, and I think the issue
   is the prohibition on the sale of nonpreviously owned
 4
 5
   firearms. So just the "non" was omitted.
            THE COURT: I think that's correct.
 6
7
            Do you agree with that?
            MR. HARDING: Yes, Your Honor.
8
9
            THE COURT: Then that will be it. I can't find my
10
   note on that topic.
11
            MR. HARDING: Your Honor, I just want -- I want to
12
   clarify that as well. The Court asked --
13
            THE COURT: If you give me a minute, it was on Bruen,
14
   and I need to -- let me look. I wrote it down, so I'll make
15
   sure that what I -- I said, "Here, the issue has been defined
16
   as purchases, not sales of previously owned firearms from a
17
   federally licensed firearm dealer," because that's what I
18
   wrote down and I read it at the time. So is that wrong?
19
            MR. HARDING: What you wrote down may not be wrong
20
   insofar as that might be what I said. But I want to clarify
21
   it's the purchase of any handguns from a federally licensed
22
   firearm dealer. We just want to highlight that they're the
23
   only source of unowned handguns and ammunition, you know,
24
   nonpreviously owned, meaning new.
25
            THE COURT: It's the purchase of any handgun?
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MR. HARDING: Any handgun and ammunition from a 1 2 federally licensed firearm dealer. 3 THE COURT: All right. MR. HARDING: That's the -- that is the conduct at 4 5 That's the conduct. issue. THE COURT: Well, that's different than what you 6 7 said. 8 MR. HARDING: Correct. When I was explaining the 9 difference between what's at issue here versus the permitted 10 conduct of purchasing ones on the street or things like that, 11 I just want to distinguish this is the only source of unowned 12 handguns as FFL. THE COURT: Well, I understand that. 13 14 MR. HARDING: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Also, I asked you -- that note was 16 written to write down exactly what your response was when I 17 asked you what do you say the conduct is that is protected by 18 the plain text of the Second Amendment. 19 MR. HARDING: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: I'm going to try to frame up an order and 21 get it issued to give you some ideas. It's an important 22 question and we need to make sure we're on the same 23 wavelength. The wavelengths changed a little bit in the 24 argument, which from time to time happens. And when that 25 happens, it's helpful to maybe get some fresh papers on it,

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and it will help you-all refine your thinking too.
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             So thank you very much. Appreciate your argument. I
 3
   look forward to your papers.
         (Court adjourned at 2:50 p.m.)
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1
                             CERTIFICATE
 2
   I, Melissa H. Custis, certify that the foregoing is
 3
   a correct transcript from the record of proceedings
   in the above-entitled matter.
 4
 5
 6
   /s/ Melissa H. Custis, RPR Date: 02/22/2023
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